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INTRODUCTION
Guido Calabresi was the first to argue that accident law should
minimize the costs of accidents, including the costs of avoiding acci-
dents.1 Calabresi warned, however, that under certain circum-
stances the presence of insurance will thwart the "general
deterrence" 2 goal of accident law:3 Irrespective of the liability rule,
if insurers do not classify insureds into sufficiently narrow risk pools,
insureds will in large measure externalize4 accident costs to their
insurers. 5 Calabresi called this problem the "externality due to in-
sufficient subcategorization"; 6 we shall refer to it as the "insurance
externality."
That insurance can blunt the deterrence 7 effects of a liability
rule is uncontroversial. 8 In fact, some commentators have argued
1 GuiDo CALABREsi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
26 (1970).
2 This Article adopts Calabresi's "general deterrence" approach, which "involves
attempting... to decide what the accident costs of activities are and letting the market
determine the degree to which, and the ways in which, activities are desired given such
costs." It at 69 (emphasis omitted). It also "involves giving people freedom to choose
whether they would rather engage in the activity and pay the costs of doing so, including
accident costs, or, given the accident costs, engage in safer activities that might other-
wise have seemed less desirable." Id
3 Calabresi was not the first to recognize this point. See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr.,
Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 557-63
(1948); Glanville Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137, 165
(1951).
4 See infra note 138.
5 G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 144-45, 248. To understand why insufficient clas-
sification permits insureds to externalize the costs'of accidents, see infra Sections I(B)(2),
nI(C) & II(D).
6 G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 145.
7 See infra note 28 and accompanying text and Section If(A) for a definition of
"deterrence."
8 See KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 17, 44 (1986); GEOFFREY PALMER,
COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACrIY 24 (1979); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 187-88 (3d ed. 1986); Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern
American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 55 (1980); John G. Fleming, The Role of Negli-
gence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 815, 823 (1967);James, supra note 3; Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L.
REv. 1281, 1298-1300 (1980); Richard A. Posner, A Theoiy of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STun.
29, 33 (1972); Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120, 120
(1982); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 574-76
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that liability insurance9 should be prohibited because of its potential
for reducing injurers' incentives to prevent accidents.10 Somewhat
surprisingly, however, no scholar since Calabresi who has raised the
issue has seriously considered whether first-party insurance"l signifi-
cantly reduces a potential victim's incentive to prevent an injury.
That is, no scholar has considered the possibility of a first-party in-
surance externality.12
For example, Professor Shavell, in his analyses of the relation-
ship between liability rules and insurance, assumes in one article
(1985); Oliver E. Williamson, Douglas G. Olson & August Ralston, Externalities, Insurance,
and Disability Analysis, 34 ECONOMICA 235, 243-44 (1967).
9 Liability insurance (sometimes called third-party insurance) provides coverage to
the injurer against having to pay for the costs of accidents for which it is liable.
10 See G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 248-50 & n.7; WILLIAM A. PROSSER & W. PAGE
KEETON, LAW or TORTS 585 (5th ed. 1984) ("For a time ... there was considerable
uncertainty as to whether any contract by which one was to be protected against the
consequences of his own negligence ... was contrary to public policy."). The legality of
negligence liability insurance was established in the U.S. by the precedent-setting deci-
sion of the Missouri Supreme Court in Breeden v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate
Glass Insur. Co., 220 Mo. 327, 119 S.W. 576 (1909). In contrast, the Soviet Union
prohibits liability insurance, in essence, because of the concern for the insurance exter-
nality. See Alice Tay, The Foundation of Tort Liability in a Socialist Legal System: Fault Versus
Insurance in Soviet Law, 19 U. TORONTO LJ. 1, 15 (1969); Andre Tunc, Introduction, XI
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw 3 (1973). The objection to liability
insurance based on the insurance externality has recently been made by Sugarman, supra
note 8, at 574-76.
There are reasons to believe that commercial liability insurance does not blunt, but
may enhance, the deterrence effects of products liability law. See infra note 247. More-
over, legal economists now argue that as a general matter liability insurance-even if it
increases the number of accidents-may be socially desirable. The economic reasoning
supporting this conclusion is roughly as follows: So long as victims are fully compen-
sated for their injuries, they will be indifferent between accident and nonaccident states
of the world. Risk-averse injurers prefer having liability insurance to not having it.
Therefore, allowing potential injurers to purchase liability insurance is Pareto superior
to disallowing it (i.e., injurers are made better off while no one else is made worse off).
Even if allowing liability insurance raises the accident rate, the resulting increase in lia-
bility insurance premiums will be more than offset by the utility gain resulting from the
reduction in risk faced by potential injurers who are risk averse. WILLIAM A. LANDES &
RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 13 (1987); R. POSNER, supra
note 8, at 188; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 212-13 (1987).
Although this justification is irrelevant to our analysis (for we are not arguing in favor of
disallowing any form of insurance), note that the justification depends on the unrealistic
assumption that consumers are fully compensated for their injuries. See infra Section
IV(B) (discussing nonpecuniary losses and fact that consumers are not "fully compen-
sated" for nonpecuniary losses).
11 First-party insurance is non-liability insurance that individuals purchase to cover
themselves against various forms of personal loss (e.g., health insurance).
12 In the conclusion, we suggest that the failure of legal economists to address the
first-party insurance externality stems from the fact that these scholars, when discussing
first-party insurance, focus on the example of car insurance. Car insurance, unlike other
forms of first-party insurance, may provide a reasonable amount of risk segregation. See
infra text accompanying notes 232-47.
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that "victims [cannot] alter accident risks"' 3 and in another article
that first-party insurers can costlessly observe insureds' prevention
activities. Under either of these assumptions, first-party insurance
will never distort the incentives of potential victims to take precau-
tions. 14 Put differently, Shavell simply assumes away the possibility
of a first-party insurance externality.
Similarly, scholars engaged in the important debate over the ef-
ficiency of our current liability regime also assume away the first-
party insurance externality.15 Professor Priest, for example, argues
that enterprise liability16 is inefficient because it requires manufac-
turers to provide consumers with product risk insurance when, in
his view, product risks can be more efficiently allocated through
first-party mechanisms.' 7 Priest premises this conclusion on his as-
sumption that all first-party insurance adequately segregates (or, as
Dean Calabresi would say, "subcategorizes")18 risk pools according
to product risks.19 Priest's ultimate conclusion-that manufacturers
should compensate consumers only when the manufacturer has
been negligent (as legal economists define the term)20-relies heav-
ily upon this assumption about first-party insurance. 2'
Professor Landes and Judge Posner also assume that first-party
insurance creates no externality. They claim that all consumers are
indifferent to risk, given that all consumers possess first-party insur-
13 Shavell, supra note 8, at 131.
14 Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 QJ. ECON. 541 (1979); see infra
Section II().
15 For a summary of this debate, see Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The
Institutional Perspective, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 184 (1987); Steven P. Croley &Jon D. Hanson,
What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liabil-
ity (forthcoming in 8 YALE J. oN REG. - (1991)).
16 By "enterprise liability" we do not mean "market share liability." Rather we
mean nonwaivable absolute liability against the manufacturer. "[E]nterprise liability...
provides in its simplest form that business enterprises ought to be responsible for losses
resulting from products they introduce into commerce." George L. Priest, The Invention
of Enterprise Liability: A Oitical History of The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 461,463 (1985); see also infra note 31 (discussing further what is meant by
"enterprise liability").
17 George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YA L.J.
1521, 1550-61 (1987).
18 G. CALABREsI, supra note 1, at 145.
19 Priest, supra note 17, at 1550-61.
20 Under a negligence regime, manufacturers are liable only for those accidents
that are least-cost preventable by the manufacturer. See infra note 28 (defining "prevent-
able"). According to Priest, any liability standard stricter than negligence generates
harmful and unnecessary insurance. Priest, supra note 17, at 1526, 1538; George L.
Priest, Modern Tort Law and its Reform, 22 VAL. U.L. REv. 2, 3 (1987).
21 Moreover, although Professor Priest concludes that a negligence rule is more
efficient, he avowedly disregards a principal deterrence justification for enterprise liabil-
ity: the optimization of manufacturer and consumer activity levels. Priest, supra note 17,
at 1537 n.90; see Croley & Hanson, supra note 15, at Part III.
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ance. Indeed, Landes and Posner rely on this claim to justify ex-
cluding insurance considerations 22 from their analysis of products
liability regimes. 23 Implicit in their reasoning must be the assump-
tion that first-party insurance does not distort the effects of products
liability rules or, in other words, that there is no insurance external-
ity. Relying on this assumption, Landes and Posner proceed to ar-
gue that the current liability regime is generally efficient.
24
Thus, in reaching contrary conclusions about the efficiency
25 of
the current liability regime, Priest and Landes and Posner, like all
other legal economists involved in this debate, fail to consider the
possibility of a first-party insurance externality. 26 Nevertheless,
these scholars and the debate in which they are engaged are having
22 See Section I(A) (describing insurance considerations).
23 W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 273; see also William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535,
536 (1985). In this article, Landes and Posner proffered the following explanation:
"We assume risk neutrality and therefore do not worry about the insur-
ance effects of strict liability .... [Tihe assumption of risk neutrality is
plausible.... [P]otential victims . . . can insure, through accident insur-
ance . . . against the consequences of product-related injuries. And if
insurance is actuarially fair, a risk-averse individual will act as if he is risk
neutral with respect to expenditures on safety."
Id. Other scholars have avoided analyzing the effects of first-party insurance, also on the
assumption that individuals are risk neutral. See, e.g., John Prather Brown, Toward an
Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973) (implicit); Steven Shavell, Strict
Liability Versus Negligence, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1980).
This Article assumes that all (or substantially all) consumers have first-party insur-
ance against the risks of product-related injuries. This assumption is commonly made in
the literature on products liability law. See, e.g., W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 10,
at 273. As Professor Priest points out, "[t]oday, the vast majority of Americans possess
health, disability, and life insurance coverage, either through private first-party sources
or through government supported Medicaid, Medicare, Veterans' Benefits and the like."
Priest, supra note 17, at 1552; see also id. at 1586-87; SENATE SUBCOMM. ON THE AGED,
99TH CONG., 2D SESS., WORKING PAPER No. 1: A PROFILE OF HEALTH BENEFITS AND THE
UNINSURED (Subcomm. Print 1986); George L. Priest, Compensation Systems and Tort Law:
A Preliminary Comparative Approach, in RISK COMPENSATION & LIABILITY: THE POLICY
CHOICES (1986). Priest argues further that although a tiny fraction of the American pop-
ulation is without some form of basic health and disability insurance, that fraction is not
central to the policy issues at stake in the products liability debate. Priest, supra note 20,
at 18-20.
24 See generally W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 273-311 (defending the
current liability regime-including its strict liability components-as generally efficient).
25 For the purposes of this Article, a liability regime is "efficient" if it minimizes the
total costs of product accidents. The term "efficient" is also used to describe the least-
cost means of effecting any goal. The terms "efficient" and "optimal" are used
interchangeably.
26 Other commentators have failed to consider the potentially deleterious conse-
quences of the first-party insurance externality. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY:
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES Ch. 7 (1988); Patricia M. Danzon, Tort
Reform and The Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 518
(1984); Richard Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645,
667-68 (1985) (implicit); Alan Schwartz, Proposalsfor Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 YALE LJ. 353, 384-88 (1988).
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a profound influence on the shape and direction of products liability
law. 27
PREVIEW
Law-and-economics scholars generally agree that an efficient
products liability regime would accomplish two principal economic
goals. First, it would encourage parties to prevent all preventable
accidents (the "deterrence" goal).28 Second, it would efficiently al-
locate the risk of unprevented accident costs (the "insurance"
goal) .29
27 See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Courts May Have to Lead Product Liability Reform, Wall St.
J., Oct. 7, 1988, § 2, at 1, col. 4 (discussing impact of scholarship, including Peter Hu-
ber's and George Priest's, on increasing the chance of fundamental judicial restructuring
of products liability law); Theodore Eisenberg &James A. Henderson, The Quiet Revolu-
tion in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rv. 479 (1990)
(demonstrating that courts have already begun restructuring products liability law); see
also Stewart, supra note 15 (describing influence of scholarship in this area). For a review
of proposed federal legislation and a list of recently enacted state legislation responding
to the "liability crisis," see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 447-
61 (1988); Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston, Policy Options, in Lmlamrrr: PERSPECTIVES
AND POLICY 223 (R. Litan & C. Winston eds. 1988); Priest, supra note 20, at I; Robert
Riley, A Critical Analysis of S. 1400, 10-14 (1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with
authors). For explanation of this "crisis," see authorities cited infra note 50. For a full
review of this debate and full discussion of its effects, see Croley & Hanson, supra note
15.
28 An accident is "preventable" *only when it can be prevented at a cost less than
the expected accident cost.
29 SeeJohn E. Calfee & Clifford Winston, Economic Aspects of Liability Rules and Liabil-
ity Insurance, in LIaBILITv: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY, supra note 27, at 16; Danzon, supra
note 26, at 518; Daniel A. Graham & Ellen Pierce, Contingent Damages for Products Liability,
13J. LEGAL STUD. 441, 441 (1984); Priest, supra note 17, at 1537; Shavell, supra note 8.
This Article does not address the comparative administrative costs of products lia-
bility rules. It is widely accepted, however, that it is theoretically unclear whether a neg-
ligence regime or an enterprise liability regime would be less expensive to administer.
R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 528-29; S. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 263-64; Landes & Pos-
ner, supra note 23, at 550; Schwartz, supra note 26, at 399; Croley & Hanson, supra note
15. For a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on this topic, see S. SHAVELL,
supra note 10, at 262-65.
We realistically assume that product injuries occur only to the purchasers of the
products. Cf AAI/AIA JOIN INDUSTRY STUDY, LARGER PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS
CLOSED IN 1985 26 (1986) (less than 14% of claims dollars were paid to bystanders).
This assumption is commonly made. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 537.
Moreover, relaxing this assumption would not alter our ultimate conclusion that an en-
terprise liability regime would be most efficient, for it is uncontroversially accepted that
enterprise liability is efficient in this context. RICHARD EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIA-
BILIrY LAw 59 (1980); Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 550-51; Schwartz, supra note
26, at 369 n.27. Courts agree. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d
578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (1969). For economic justifications of
enterprise liability on the basis of its ability to lower total accident costs by reducing
those to third-party victims, see RICHARD B. STEWART &JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 227 (2d ed. 1978); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Strict Liability v. Negligence in a
Market Setting, 70 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 363 (1980). This Article also assumes
that all relevant markets are reasonably competitive. For discussions of the effect of
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This Article explores the insurance and deterrence implications
of important and long overlooked facts. Consumers are insured
through first-party mechanisms against most of the risks of product
accidents. However, first-party insurers rarely and imperfectly ad-
just premiums according to an individual consumer's decisions con-
cerning exactly what products she will purchase, how many of those
products she will purchase, and how carefully she will consume
them.30 Such consumer decisions we refer to as "consumption
choices." This failure by first-party insurers to adjust premiums ac-
cording to consumption choices gives rise to a first-party insurance
externality. Based on this insight, this Article offers an economic
justification for an "enterprise liability" regime that does not recog-
nize the defense of contributory negligence. 31
Section I initially explains the insurance goal of a products lia-
bility regime. It then discusses several causes and the insurance im-
plications of the first-party insurance externality. Section I
concludes that, contrary to the claims of recent scholarship,
3 2
whether enterprise liability is inferior or superior to first-party in-
surance at allocating the risk of product accidents remains an unan-
swered empirical question. Section II explains the deterrence goal
of a products liability regime. It then describes two additional
causes of the first-party insurance externality. Most important, Sec-
tion II examines the deterrence implications of that externality and
argues that, because of the failure of first-party insurance to classify
according to consumption choices, consumers externalize33 the
market power on liability rules, see Dennis Epple & Arthur Raviv, Product Safety: Liability
Rules, Market Structure, and Imperfect Information, 68 AM. EcoN. REV. 80 (1978); Mitchell
Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market
Power, 14 BELLJ. ECON. 581 (1983).
30 See infra Sections I(B)(2) and II(D) (discussing externalities associated with first-
party insurance).
31 By enterprise liability we mean absolute manufacturer liability. The concept of
"product defect" is irrelevant for our purposes. Note that we recommend enterprise
liability not as a default rule: under our proposal there would be no opting out of the
liability rule through warranty limitations or exculpatory clauses. An immutable rule is
more appropriate because the first-party insurance externality, as we show, undermines
the contractual relationship between manufacturers and consumers for the same reasons
that it undermines the efficacy of a liability rule less strict than absolute liability. This
point is made in much greater detail in Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Understand-
ing Products Liability (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
32 E.g., P. HUBER, supra note 26, at 133-34, 205-06; Guido Calabresi, First Party,
Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About
Them?, 69 IowA L. REv. 833, 838 n.20 (1984); Epstein, supra note 26; Priest, supra note
17; Michael J. Trebilcock, The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Civil
Liability Rules, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1988) [hereinafter Trebilcock, Efficient Liability
Rules]; Michael J. Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North Ameri-
can Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
929, 929 (1987) [hereinafter Trebilcock, The Dilemma].
33 See infra note 138 (explaning "externalization").
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costs of product accidents to first-party insurers.
Section III analyzes the comparative efficiency of various prod-
ucts liability rules in light of this insurance externality. The Section
demonstrates that, under certain assumptions, a regime of enter-
prise liability that excludes a defense of contributory negligence
would most efficiently serve the deterrence goal of products liability
law.
To simplify exposition, this Article assumes in Sections I
through III that consumers are perfectly informed about the ex-
pected risks of their consumption choices and that all such risks are
pecuniary (i.e., replaceable by money or a substitute good). Admit-
tedly, these assumptions are unrealistic. Therefore, Section IV re-
analyzes the issues discussed in Sections I through III in light of the
fact that consumers may be imperfectly informed about product
risks and that these risks may contain a significant nonpecuniary ele-
ment. The Article's ultimate conclusion, though slightly qualified
by Section IV's reanalysis, remains essentially unchanged: Because
first-party insurers fail to classify insureds according to their con-
sumption choices, an enterprise liability regime excluding the con-
tributory negligence defense would most efficiently serve the
deterrence goal of products liability law. This conclusion, of course,
represents a radical departure from the recent scholarly consensus
that products liability law should move away from enterprise
liability.
3 4
I
OPTIMAL PRODUCT RISK INSURANCE: FIRST-PARTY
INSURANCE VERSUS ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
A. The Insurance Goal: Allocating Risk35
A tort regime's ability to allocate the risks of unprevented prod-
uct accidents may be as important a determinant of that regime's
34 See, e.g., P. HUBER, supra note 26 (arguing that manufacturers should be permit-
ted to contract around products liability rules); Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Lia-
bility and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942 (1988); Calfee & Winston, supra
note 29 (arguing for return to negligence); Danzon, supra note 26 (arguing in favor of
returning to a negligence regime and limiting or eliminating noripecuniary losses);
Epstein, supra note 26 (same); Priest, supra note 20 (arguing in favor of adopting a partic-
ular negligence regime); Schwartz, supra note 23 (arguing that consumers and manufac-
turers should be permitted to opt out of the default rule, and that the default rule should
be strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence, and that nonpecuniary-loss
damage awards should be disallowed by default). For a more complete explication of
these views, see Croley & Hanson, supra note 31.
35 For accessible discussions of the theory of insurance, see KENNETH ARROW,
EssAYs IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 134-43 (1971); R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note
27, at 55-70; S. SHA ELL, supra note 10, at 186-99.
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overall efficiency as is its ability to deter product accidents.3 6 The
proper allocation of risk increases social welfare directly by reducing
the risk borne by the risk averse.37 It also increases social-welfare
indirectly by permitting the risk averse to engage in socially desira-
ble, risky activities and by permitting them to use the assets they
would otherwise reserve to offset potential losses.3 8
If transaction costs were zero and if insurers and consumers
were perfectly informed as to each individual consumer's expected
accident costs, 39 risk-averse consumers would willingly pay an
actuarially fair insurance premium 4o to protect themselves fully
against the uncertain costs of product accidents. Under these as-
sumptions, insurers could write and monitor fully specified poli-
cies41 that would induce insureds to invest optimally in accident
prevention. 42 Under the more realistic assumptions of positive
transaction and information costs, however, the provision of full in-
surance against product risks will, for several reasons, create a loss
of social welfare.
1. Moral Hazard
First, to the extent that insurers do not perfectly adjust premi-
ums to reflect the actual risks generated by each insured's consump-
tion choices, insureds will not fully internalize expected accident
costs and, consequently, will not invest efficiently in prevention. 43
An individual insured will tend to consider only what she must pay
out-of-pocket rather than the total costs. In the long run, the total
costs will be included in raised premiums, but the extra cost will be
36 S. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 192.
37 Risk-averse individuals are those whose marginal utility of income, though posi-
tive, decreases as income increases. In other words, an individual is risk averse if she
prefers a certain return to an uncertain return of the same expected value. Milton Fried-
man & L. J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. EcON. 279
(1948); John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, 32 ECONOMICA 122, 122-
24 (1964). The evidence suggests, and it is generally presumed, that consumers are risk
averse. R. COOTR & T. ULEN, supra note 27, at 60; R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 11. For a
brief explanation of why consumers demand insurance, see note 204, infra.
38 S. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 190-92.
39 Expected accident costs equal the costs of an accident multiplied by the
probability of its occurrence.
40 An "actuarially fair" premium equals the insured's expected accident costs. This
Article assumes for simplicity that insurance premiums are actuarially fair. But see infra
notes 46, 48 (examples assume premiums exceed what would be actuarially fair in order
to give the insurer a profit).
41 A fully specified policy would exhaustively enumerate the obligations of insureds
and insurers in every possible state of the world.
42 S. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 195; Shavell, supra note 8, at 127-28; see infra Section
II(C).
43 Optimal accident prevention requires placing the total costs of accidents on
those activities which create them. See infra Section II(A).
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spread over all policyholders. All insureds have this incentive and
follow this strategy. Therefore, all insureds end up paying more for
insurance and having more accidents than they would if they were
required to weigh the full costs to themselves of an accident-prone
activity against the benefits they receive. 44 This phenomenon is
known as "moral hazard."
45
2. Cross-Subsidization
To the extent that insureds who present different levels of risk
(expected damages) are charged the same premium and lumped
into the same insurance pool, low-damage insureds will cross-subsi-
dize high-damage insureds. Consequently, the former will pay more
(and the latter will pay less) than the efficient amount towards insur-
ance. An allocatively efficient insurance regime would charge in-
sureds competitively according to their individual risk.46
44 The classic illustration of this problem arises when some people (you know who
you are) dine out and agree in advance to split the check evenly. Each has an incentive
to order more expensively than if paying only for his own meal. Yet, in the end, each
individual as a member of the group must bear the cost of the collective over-ordering.
45 Moral hazard also includes more deliberate acts, such as arson or suicide, that
insureds sometimes engage in because they are insured. For more complete expositions
of moral hazard, see Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM.
ECON. REv. 531 (1968); KennethJ. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard- Further Com-
ment, 58 AM. EcoN. REv. 537 (1968); Bengt H6lmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability,
10 BELLJ. ECON. 74 (1979); Shavell, supra note 14; see also Epstein, supra note 26, at 653
(discussing moral hazard). The problem of moral hazard plagues all forms of first-party
insurance. Health insurance provides a typical example. Patients who are filly insured
tend to consume a much greater volume of health services than do patients who are
partially insured. SeeJoseph P. Newhouse, Willard G. Manning, et al., Some Interim Results
From a Controlled Trial of Cost Sharing in Health Insurance, 305 NEw ENG. J. OF MEDICINE
1501 (1981). But moral hazard poses problems no matter the risk involved. In Japan,
insurers recently began to offer insurance to golfers against the risk of having to throw
an expensive party should the insured make a hole-in-one. Such parties are the custom
among Japanese golfers. The rate of holes-in-one jumped significantly following the
advent of this first-party party insurance. Players, it turns out, colluded with their cad-
dies to create the false impression of holes-in-one. Because of this moral hazard prob-
lem, Japanese insurers are now on the verge of withdrawing this insurance. E.S.
Browning, A Stroke of Luck is Bad News in Japan if One Isn't Insured, Wall St. J., Aug 12,
1985, at 1, col. 4.
46 See PAULJ. FELDSTEIN, HEALT'H CARE ECONOMICS 157 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing
inefficiency of cross-subsidies in insurance pools); Ronald H. Coase, The Marginal Cost
Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA 169 (1946) (describing allocative inefficiencies resulting from
cross-subsidies generally).
To better understand this point, consider an example (Table 1). Suppose there are
two equally sized groups of insureds, A and B. Group A has low expected damages
($50) and Group B has high expected damages ($100).
Table 1
Group Value Cs) Expected Damages ($) Normal Profit(S)
A 100 50 10
B 100 100 10
Suppose further that insurers must, to earn normal profits, charge $10 in addition to the
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3. Adverse Selection and Unravelling
Another potential welfare loss associated with full insurance oc-
curs when potential insureds who know that they pose above aver-
age risk "self-select" into insurance pools. This "adverse
selection" 47 is a function of (1) the insurer's being unable to classify
insureds perfectly according to each insured's expected damages,
and (2) the insureds' knowing how their own expected damages
compare to the average expected damages of the insurance pool. It
depends, in other words, on asymmetrical information regarding ex-
pected damages. Under these circumstances, an insurer cannot per-
fectly control the variance of risk pools. The greater the
heterogeneity or variance of risks allowed in an insurance pool, the
greater the tendency will be of high-damage individuals to opt into
the pool and of low-damage individuals to opt out. Adverse selec-
tion creates a social welfare loss by raising the pool's average risk
and thereby forcing low-risk individuals to choose between paying
disproportionately high premiums or foregoing insurance.
The latter possibility-that low-risk insureds will drop out of
risk pools-can lead to risk-pool "unravelling." That is, as low-
damage insureds give up their insurance, the premium must be
raised to cover the pool's increased average risk. This induces other
relatively low-risk insureds to drop out, insurers to further increase
premiums, and so it goes.48
Ideally, insurance should minimize the welfare losses resulting
actuarially fair premium. If insurers cannot cost-justifiably determine to which group an
insured belongs, insurers will charge all insureds the same premium of $85, or 1/2($50)
+ 1/2($100) + $10. Group A insureds and Group B insureds will continue to buy
insurance, because each insured, we shall assume, receives a positive net benefit from
insurance costing $100 or less. Yet this result is allocatively inefficient. The social costs
of insuring Group B insureds is $110, not $85. If insurers could distinguish between
Group A and Group B, Group A insureds would continue to buy insurance and might
even buy more because for them the price would drop from $85 to $60. Group B in-
sureds, on the other hand, would give up their insurance because it would cost them
$110, which is $10 more than they are willing to pay. This would be the efficient result.
Cf Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 557-58 (similar analysis applied to related point).
Like an excise tax which is placed on certain goods but not others and which therefore
distorts relative prices, if insurers cannot distinguish between high-damage and low-
damage insureds, insurance premiums will act as a tax on low-damage insureds and a
subsidy to high-damage insureds. Because insurance premiums do not vary according
to expected costs of individual insureds, premiums will distort individual demand for
insurance and generate allocative inefficiencies. P. FELDSTEIN, supra, at 157.
47 RICHARD G. LIPSEY, PETER 0. STEINER & DOUGLAS D. PuRvis, ECONOMIcs 437-38
(7th ed. 1984) [hereinafter R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER]. See generally Michael Rothschild &
Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of
Imperfect Information, 90 QJ. EcON. 629 (1976) (discussing effects of adverse selection on
private insurance markets).
48 K. ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 15; Epstein, supra note 26, at 650-52. See generally
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
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from moral hazard, cross-subsidization, adverse selection, and un-
ravelling while maximizing the welfare gain created by risk
spreading.49
B. Meeting the Insurance Goal: First-Party Insurance versus
Enterprise Liability
This Section analyzes the comparative abilities of two insurance
mechanisms-first-party insurance and enterprise liability qua insur-
ance-to efficiently allocate the risks of unprevented product acci-
dents.50 Under either mechanism, as Part B of this Section explains,
84 QJ.. ECON. 488 (1970) (describing adverse selection and unravelling process in used
car market).
Returning to the example at supra note 46, now assume there is asymmetrical infor-
mation such that insureds, but not insurers, know the Group in which each insured be-
longs (Table 2). Assume also that the number of Group A and Group B insureds can
vary. As already explained, the insurer will initially charge $85.
Table 2
Group Value ($) Expected Damages ($) Normal Profit ($)
A 85 50 10
B 130 100 10
The value that each group places on being insured varies in this example because the
members of each group now know their own expected damages. Consequently, any
Group B individuals who had no insurance will buy insurance, because for a mere $85
premium they can obtain insurance that they value at $130. This tendency for high-
damage individuals to join insurance pools is what is meant by "adverse selection." At
the same time, however, there will not be an increase in the number of Group A in-
sureds, because Group A individuals will be indifferent between paying an $85 premium
and going uninsured. Hence, the ratio of Type B insureds to Type A insureds will in-
crease. Suppose the ratio increases from 1/2 before the adverse selection to 3/5 as a
result of adverse selection. The insurer will have to raise its premium to $90, or
2/5($50) + 3/5($100) + $10, in order to cover the higher average damages of its new
risk pool. Notice, however, that when the insurer raises its premiums to $90, Group A
insureds will give up insurance altogether, because it will cost $5 more than they are
willing to pay. This phenomenon is known as "unravelling." In this example, the ulti-
mate result of adverse selection and unravelling is for low-damage insureds to forego
insurance entirely and for premiums to rise to $110, or 0($50) + 1($100) + $10.
49 See S. SnAvELL, supra note 10, at 196-97.
50 This Article assumes for simplicity that manufacturers are risk-neutral and that
they self-insure. But see infra note 247 (relaxing this assumption and arguing that there is
no liability-insurance externality). There is no consensus, however, as to how firms do
or should behave in the face of risk. Richard M. Cyert & Charles L. Hedrick, Theory of the
Firm: Past, Present, and Future: An Interpretation, 10 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 398, 403-04
(1972); see also S. SnAvE.LL, supra note 10, at 189-90 (arguing that even if firms have
incentives to behave in risk-averse ways, shareholders would prefer that they act as if
risk-neutral); Guido Calabresi, Products Liability: Curse or Bulwark of Free Enterprise, 27
CLuv. ST. L. REv. 313, 321 (1978) (arguing that firms in a free-enterprise economy
should welcome opportunity to administer risks; i.e., they should act as risk preferrers).
But see David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On Corporate Demandfor Insurance, 52 J. Bus.
281 (1982) (explaining why even risk-neutral corporations might demand liability insur-
ance).
Several legal economists have recently argued that expansions in products liability
law toward enterprise liability have created the "liability insurance crisis." See, e.g.,
Priest, supra note 17, (arguing that enterprise liability has led to the unravelling of con-
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insurers will employ two principal methods-copayment features
and risk classification-of combatting the potential sources of ineffi-
ciency in insurance risk pools. Part B describes the primary copay-
ment features in first-party insurance and argues that similar
features exist under an enterprise liability regime. Part C of this
Section explains the insurance benefits of risk classification and
demonstrates that first-party insurers suboptimally classify insureds
according to consumption choices. Part C also argues that, without
empirical evidence, one cannot determine which of the two insur-
ance mechanisms-first-party or enterprise liability-can better
classify insureds according to "individual-risk characteristics." 51
1. Copayment Features
a. First-Party Insurance.5
2
To limit possible risk-pool inefficiencies, first-party insurers
often introduce copayment features, such as deductibles and coin-
surance, into insurance arrangements. Those copayment features,
by requiring insureds, ex ante, to include some portion of the acci-
dent costs in their decision calculus, help to align the incentives of
insureds and insurers and thereby mitigate risk-pool inefficiencies.5 3
Deductibles require insureds to pay up to some set portion of their
accident expenses (for example, the first $175) before the insurer
will pay all or some fraction of the remainder. Coinsurance arrange-
ments, on the other hand, provide that the insurer pays only a frac-
tion (for example, seventy-five percent) of an insured's total losses.
Note, however, that first-party insurance contracts typically include
"out-of-pocket limits," which place a cap on the amount of copay-
ments an insured can be required to pay per year.54
sumer-risk pools and provider-risk pools); P. HUBER, supra note 26, at ch.7 (adopting
Priest's view of the "crisis"); Trebilcock, The Dilemma, supra note 32 (arguing that enter-
prise liability has increased the socio-legal risk facing liability insurers and that that has
led to the "crisis"); Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive
Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367, 455 (1988) (arguing that enterprise liability
together with capital constraints facing liability insureds have led to the "crisis"). These
scholars offer the "crisis" as evidence for their claim that enterprise liability is ineffi-
cient, not taking into account the first-party insurance externality in their explanations
of the "crisis." For an explanation of why the "liability crisis" actually provides evidence
that 'enterprise liability is efficient given the first-party insurance externality, see Croley
& Hanson, supra note 15.
51 See infra Section I(B)(2)(b) (defining individual-risk characteristics).
52 The information we discuss in this and later sections on the actual practices of
first-party insurers derives from (in addition to authorities cited) telephone
conversations with insurance agents and brokers, as well as with industry experts.
53 K. ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 15; Danzon, supra note 26, at 526.
54 A $175 deductible and 15%o coinsurance, as well as a $1500 out-of-pocket limit,
are typical of group health insurance contracts. For a $10,000 health expense, then, the
insured's copayments would be $1659 ($175 in deductible and $1474 (.15 x $9825) in
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b. Enterprise Liability.
Recent critics of enterprise liability have argued that moral haz-
ard would abound under such a system because manufacturers sup-
posedly cannot employ copayment arrangements. 55 Enterprise
liability, however, contains features that approximate copayment ar-
rangements; consumers, under enterprise liability, bear some por-
tion of their product-accident losses. For example, consumers
making consumption choices will discount potential product liability
awards by the probability of losing a suit5 , and will subtract from
their expected awards the costs of litigation. 57
Suppose a consumer, in deciding whether to take optimal or
suboptimal care when using a particular product, faces an expected
accident cost of $10,000 should she take suboptimal care. Suppose
further that she considers her chances of winning an enterprise lia-
bility suit, should she actually be injured, to be eighty percent,58 and
the cost of litigating such a suit to be $3000. 59 Under those circum-
stances, our consumer would be insured for up to $5600 of her ex-
pected product-accident cost.60 Therefore, she would, ex ante,
coinsurance), which is above the out-of-pocket limit by $149. Therefore, the insured
would pay $1500, and the insurer would pay the balance, $8500. Telephone interview
with Peter Thexton, Chief Actuary for the Health Insurance Association of America
(Nov. 15, 1988) [hereinafter Thexton Interview]. Whether policy limits efficiently en-
courage care on the part of insureds is an unanswered question. See Mark V. Pauly,
Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure'in the Medical Economy, 24 J. EcoN. LrrERA-
TURE 629, 642 (1986) (describing oddity of policy limits in first-party insurance).
55 Epstein, supra note 26, at 668. Professor Priest has argued that first-party insur-
ance is superior to enterprise liability because the former generally incorporates copay-
ments, whereas, according to Priest, the latter cannot: "[D]eductibles and co-insurance
are features of every first-party insurance contract. Third-party insurance through the
tort system, in contrast, never incorporates deductibles or co-insurance to control victim
moral hazard." Priest, supra note 17, at 1553 (emphasis added); see also Priest, supra note
20, at 16 (making similar assertion).
56 Settlements, too, will reflect this probability.
57 See W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion, 17 J. LEGAL STUn.
101, 118 (1988).
58 This figure is purely conjectural. Presumably, however, consumers would not be
certain of winning in court since, even under an enterprise liability regime, plaintiffs
must at least establish causation. See infra Section III. Recent economic studies of litiga-
tion suggest that plaintiffs win about 50%o of litigated cases. George L. Priest & Benja-
min Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
59 Thirty percent may be a fairly accurate estimation of such costs, given that con-
tingency fees are usually in this range. For a more complete discussion of the various
types and relative magnitudes of litigation costs, see GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL
PROCEDURE 285-95 (3d ed. 1985). For models discussing the effect of legal costs on civil
litigation and settlement rates, see generally John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Con-
flicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or
I'll Be Suing You, 18J. LEGAL SrUD. 157 (1989); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of
the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL StUD. 399 (1973).
60 ($10,000 - $3000) X .80 = $5600.
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internalize $4400 in copayments. Furthermore, she will be even less
willing to take inefficient risks because she is uncertain of the actual
amount of compensation she will receive and is risk averse.6 1 Fi-
nally, to the extent that consumers are not fully compensated for
nonpecuniary losses, the risk of such losses will also mitigate moral
hazard. 62
Some scholars have argued that certain tort doctrines (such as
contributory negligence) mitigate moral hazard insofar as they re-
quire consumers to internalize the costs of product accidents that
consumers can prevent at cheapest cost.63 As Section III describes,
however, these doctrines may, because of the first-party insurance
externality, be largely ineffective. 64
61 See Viscusi, supra note 57, at 107-08.
62 Here our assumption that all losses are pecuniary is temporarily relaxed. For the
proposition that nonpecuniary losses cannot be fully recompensed, see S. SHAvELL, supra
note 10, at I 1 n.9; Priest, supra note 17, at 1547-48; see also G. CALABRsx, supra note 1, at
65, 214-25 (discussing consequences of fact that money damages cannot fully compen-
sate for many types of injuries); Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 107, 162-63 (1974) (arguing that money is inadequate means of compensation
against permanent disabilities and pain and suffering). For a discussion of how nonpe-
cuniary losses would mitigate moral hazard problems if enterprise liability were the rule
in the handgun industry, see Comment, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns As An
Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 369, 376 (1987) (authored by Andrew 0.
Smith).
63 Other tort doctrines that might serve an insurance function include assumption
of risk, mitigation of damages, extrasensitivity, comparative negligence, and normal and
proper use. Professor Trebilcock argues that these doctrines "attempt in theory to ad-
dress explicitly the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard." MichaelJ. Trebil-
cock, Comment on Epstein, 14 J. LEGAL SUD. 675, 677 (1985). This observation is by no
means new to law-and-economics scholars. See William Bishop, The Contract-Tort Bound-
aiy and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 248-51, 260-63 (1983); Cala-
bresi, supra note 32, at 837 n.18; Epstein, supra note 26, at 666; Richard S. Higgins,
Products Liability Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Contributory Negligence, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 111,
130 (1981); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Dikes, Dams, and Vwious Hogs: Entitlement and Efficenky
in Tort Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 38-41 (1989). Other scholars have proposed new
doctrinal solutions to the problem of moral hazard. For example, Professor Rose-Acker-
man has proposed that-because an unqualified rule of strict injurer liability (ie., enter-
prise liability) places no incentive on victims to take care---"victims should be paid for
the level of preventive activity that would be efficient plus the consequential damages
that would have resulted if the precautions had been taken.... whether or not they actually
have taken care." Id at 25-26 (emphasis in original). Other commentators have recom-
mended that contractual arrangements between manufacturers and consumers be al-
lowed to operate to provide consumers with proper incentives to take care. P. HUBER,
supra note 26; Epstein, supra note 26; Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in
Product Liability Law, 10 CAMwozo L. REv. 2193, 2200 (1989); George L. Priest, A Theory
of Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981); Schwartz, supra note 26, at 653-
58; Stewart, supra note 15, at 193; Note, Imperfect Information, The Pricing Mechanism, and
Products Liability, 88 COLUM. L. Rav. 1057 (1988) (authored by Mark Geistfeld).
64 See infra Section II(B).
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2. Risk Classification: The Insurance Implications of the First-Party
Insurance Externality
As already explained, the broader the risk pools, the greater
will be the cross-subsidization and the tendency toward adverse se-
lection and unravelling.65 Hence, the more narrowly insurers can
define risk pools, the more efficient the insurance mechanism will
be. In choosing between first-party insurance and enterprise liabil-
ity qua insurance the goal should be to pick the scheme that-other
things equal-best classifies insureds according to their expected ac-
cident costs. 66 Insurers, to earn higher profits, 67 have an incentive
to classify insureds according to expected accident costs and to ad-
just premiums accordingly.68 By doing so, an insurer can offer low-
damage insureds lower premiums, while charging high-damage in-
sureds higher premiums.
An insured's expected accident costs are a function of her con-
sumption choices and individual-risk characteristics. 69 We examine
each of these in turn.
a. Classifying According to Consumption Choices.
As suggested above, scholars typically believe that first-party in-
surers-by applicant screening and, for some risks, by experience
rating-are able to segregate consumer risk pools quite well. 70 Ex-
65 See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
66 See G. CA.LABRsi, supra note 1, at 170 (arguing that in choosing between liability
rules, "it is better.., to put the initial loss on that party whose liability will most cheaply
result in important subcategorizations").
67 K. ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 67; see supra note 46.
68 For a more complete discussion of why competitive forces provide insurers with
incentives to narrow risk pools and of why these incentives are efficient, see Priest, supra
note 17, at 1545; see also ALAIN C. ENTHovEN, HEALr PLAN 80 (1980) (describing how
health insurers in a free market would attempt to classify insureds until each insured was
"charged a premium essentially equal to the expected costs of his or her own medical
care").
69 "Individual-risk characteristic" is defined infta Section I(B)(2)(b). Using differ-
ent terminology, other writers have also distinguished between consumption choices
and individual-risk characteristics. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 171 (with re-
gard to car insurance, "[i]f placing the loss on drivers results in significant subclassifica-
tions by characteristics of drivers [ie., individual-risk characteristics] and, reasonably
cheaply, in price distinctions among cars driven [i.e., consumption choices], then a gen-
eral deterrence argument exists for saying that drivers are the better loss bearers. This
is so unless placing the loss on manufacturers results in much more subcategorization by
car characteristics [ie., consumption choices] than would the alternative allocation, and
this further subcategorization is deemed much more important than some subcat-
egorization by characteristics of drivers [i.e., individual-risk characteristics]."); Priest,
supra note 17, at 1548-49, 1557-58 (distinguishing between "information about individ-
ual risks" and information based on the risks of products).
70 See G. CAABREsI, supra note 32, at 836-37; Epstein, supra note 26, at 660 ("Typi-
cally, [first-party insurers] demand detailed information from insureds before taking or
rejecting a risk: ... [For example,] [d]riving records are examined before automobile
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
cept perhaps for car insurance, however, first-party insurers rarely
segregate insureds according to their consumption choices.
71
It will become clear that under an enterprise liability regime,
consumers would, in large measure, be segregated according to
consumption choices. Our immediate objective, however, is to
make clear what our examination of insurance policies and our in-
terviews with those in the insurance industry have strongly con-
firmed: first-party insurers make little or no effort to segregate
insureds according to consumption choices. First, let us review the
few, largely irrelevant exceptions to that general finding. It is true
that some first-party insurers for some types of insurance segregate
consumers who use certain exceptional products. Some insurers at-
tempt to classify according to whether applicants smoke cigarettes,
abuse alcohol, use controlled drugs, or engage in extremely danger-
ous activities (e.g., scuba diving below forty feet or hang gliding).72
These are consumption choices whose expected costs are high
enough to significantly affect an insured's total expected losses; they
also are products whose use correlates highly with other risky activi-
ties.73 Stated differently, insurers who charge higher premiums to
smokers do so not only because smoking is itself an exceptionally
insurance is issued."); see also Priest, supra note 17, at 1557 ("First-party insurers, by
using insurance applications, can distinguish insureds by age, income, occupation, the
level of coverage desired, and other personal characteristics related to levels of risk
brought to the insurance pool.... The collection of these data allows a first-party in-
surer to define risk pools of very narrow scope.") (emphasis added); Schwartz, supra note
26, at 405 ("[I]nsurance companies can key rates to observable traits that correlate nega-
tively with the making of claims.").
71 Thexton Interview, supra note 54.
72 Telephone interview with John O'Mahoney, Manager of Health Underwriting for
Aetna Insurance Company in Hartford, Connecticut (Nov. 28, 1988) [hereinafter
O'Mahoney Interview]. For samples of typical policies, see ROBERT KEETON, BAsic IN-
SURANCE LAw 1045-72 (1977). In addition to these exceptions, commentators some-
times offer the example of first-party casualty (fire) insurers who adjust premiums
depending on whether insureds have sprinklers, smoke alarms, or fireproofing. Losses
that might otherwise be covered by casualty insurance, however, typically constitute a
comparatively insignificant percentage of total products liability damage awards. See
Priest, supra note 20, at 17 ("Tort Law damages are dominated by lost income and pain
and suffering .... ); cf. Priest, supra note 17, at 1545-46 (insurance for property losses
has been largely unaffected by the "liability crisis"). Thus, the ability to classify insureds
according to these characteristics will be relatively unimportant in the choice between
products liability rules. Note also that items such as smoke detectors or sprinklers are
not typical consumer goods in the sense that they are not consumed for reasons other
than to affect the insured risk. Most consumer products are manufactured to serve some
primary purpose besides reducing accident costs. Fire extinguishers constitute a form of
self-insurance; they are "consumed" to reduce the expected cost of an accident. This is
not to say that such preventive measures are unimportant, but only to suggest that they
are less relevant to this section's discussion of consumption choices and are more rele-
vant to the discussion below ofinsureds' individual-risk characteristics. See infra Section
I(B) (2)(b).
73 O'Mahoney Interview, supra note 72.
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dangerous activity, but also because the correlative consumption
choices and lifestyle characteristics of smokers combine to create
even larger health risks.74
The extent to which this sort of classification narrows risk
pools, however, is de minimis for several reasons. First, only a small
percentage of insurers attempts to classify in this way. Most health
insurance, for example, is provided through private-sector group in-
surers such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, through prepaid plans such
as health maintenance organizations, or through public programs
such as Medicaid or Medicare.75 For these forms of insurance, in-
surers virtually never require smokers to pay higher premiums than
non-smokers. 76 Second, those insurers who do attempt to classify
insureds according to whether they smoke do not classify according
to how often, how long, or what brand of cigarette an insured has
smoked. 77 A casual user of Carlton Ultra-Lights is pooled with a
four-pack-a-day smoker of Camel Filterless-hardly a narrow risk
pool. Even if these general classifications serve a segregative pur-
pose, the ease with which insureds can falsify responses further at-
tenuates their usefulness. 78 More important, other than for these
few exceptional products, insurers do not even attempt to classify in-
sureds according to their consumption choices. 79 Thus, insurers do
74 A. LEE FRITSHLER, SMOKING AND POLmTcs: POLICYMAKING AND THE FEDERAL Bu-
REA UcRACY 22 (3d ed. 1983) (suggesting that nonsmokers may live longer because they
watch their health); TOBACCO INSTITUTE STUDY, SMOKING AND HEALTH 1964-1979 THE
CONTINUING CONTROVERSY (Jan. 1989) (linking smoking to cancer and other diseases
may be unfounded because of conflicting evidence); Frederick L. McGuire, Smoking,
Driver Education, and other Correlates of Accidents Among Young Males, 4 J. SAFETY REs. 5
(1972) (smokers have higher accident rates than nonsmokers); David Mechanic, The Sta-
bility of Health and Illness Behavior: Results from a 16-Year Follow-Up, 69 Am.J. PUB. HA.TH
1142 (1979) (nonsmokers are more likely to wear seat belts than smokers). The fact that
smoking correlates with other high-risk activities may explain the generality of insurers'
questions regarding whether an applicant smokes. See infra text accompanying note 77.
For a discussion of the deleterious deterrence effects of adjusting premiums based on
correlation, see infra note 155.
75 See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
76 Telephone interview with Tom Musco, Director of Statistics with the Health In-
surance Association of America (Nov. 6, 1988) [hereinafter Musco Interview].
77 O'Mahoney Interview, supra note 72.
78 Id; see infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
79 See Gary Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 313, 318-19 (1990) ("[M]any lines of 'personal' insurance .. .make no
effort to reflect the individual's accident potential."). Life insurers fail to segregate in-
sureds according to their consumption choices. Indeed, only 55.5% of life insurance is
purchased "individually to meet individual needs." AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSUR-
ANCE, 1988 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 17 [hereinafter LIFE INSURANCE FACT BooK]. A
recent survey shows that 94% of policy applicants for even this relatively individualized
form of life insurance (i.e., "ordinary life insurance") were accepted and were offered
"standard rates" which varied somewhat to reflect the age and gender of the applicant;
"extra-risk" (ie., nonstandard) rates were required of another 4% of applicants because
of the applicants' poor health or hazardous occupations; and 2% were denied coverage
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
not raise premiums for insureds who have particularly hard and slip-
pery bath tubs8 0 nor lower premiums for those who use clothes
irons that shut off automatically.8 s
There are several reasons why first-party insurers fail to classify
insureds efficiently according to consumption choices, notwith-
standing the putative benefits of risk classification.8 2 First, an in-
surer will only classify risks when the benefits to the insurer of
further classification exceed the costs. 8 3 The cost to first-party in-
surers of analyzing the safety characteristics of every consumer
product and the consumption choices of every insured may be high
enough alone to prevent such classification.8 4 By contrast, manufac-
turers have relatively inexpensive access to and control over infor-
mation regarding the risks inherent in their products.8 5 For this
reason, it may be more efficient to put the insurance burden on
altogether because of "serious health impairments" or "extremely hazardous jobs." Id
at 103-04. Thus, providers of even the most individualized form of life insurance seem
to make no premium adjustment according to insured's consumption choices. See also
infra text accompanying note 104 (explaining that much of life insurance is purchased on
a group basis and provides virtually no classification of insureds even according to their
individual-risk characteristics). For a description of how worker's compensation insur-
ance undermines risk-reduction incentives of workers, see W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Di-
minished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks
to Health and Safety, 6 YALEJ. ON REG. 65, 86-87 (1989).
80 Various safety features are now available for bath tubs--e.g., no-skid bottoms,
non-angled bottoms, plastic tubs and plastic siding, wall-flush soap holders, wall-flush
hand rails, single-unit water control mechanisms, etc. For all the safety characteristics
now available, we would expect there to be more, and we would expect more consumers
to take advantage of them, but for the first-party insurance externality.
81 Cf Andrew Blum, Safety Isn't Always First at Home, 10 Nat'l L.J.,July 25, 1988, at 1,
col. 1 (suggesting which household appliances are particularly prone to causing acci-
dents and sampling lawsuits around the country involving 10 commonly used household
products).
82 See supra Section I(A) (explaining the benefits of risk classification).
83 "[T]he degree of pooling that occurs is a function more of what it costs insur-
ance companies to differentiate among categories of insured than of any clearly defined
collective choice of what degree of spreading is more desirable from a societal point of
view." G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 47.
84 See K. ABRAHAm, supra note 8, at 45, 67, 78; G. CAaLtAREsi, supra note 1, at 146; P.
FELDSTEIN, supra note 46, at 141; S. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 214. But see Art-Commen-
tary, 97 YALE LJ. 1105, 1109 (1988) (authored by Barbara Kruger) (suggesting, albeit
abstractly, that large insurance companies are better than is commonly believed at moni-
toring insureds' consumption choices).
85 See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto
Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. Cn. L. Rv. 239, 250 (1967) (Outside of the auto-
accident context, it is better to hold manufacturers liable for nonfault accidents because
manufacturers are in a position "to make an economic calculus of accident losses and
accident risks."); Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE LJ. 1055, 1062 (1972) (manufacturer often "best suited to make the cost-
benefit analysis and to act upon it"); Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Risk and Tort Reform:
Comment on Calabresi & Klevorick, 14J. LEGAL S-D. 633, 638 (1985); see also authorities
cited infra notes 129, 163; cf. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453,
467, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) ("Manufacturing processes, fre-
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manufacturers by adopting an enterprise liability regime than to put
it on first-party insurers through a negligence regime. "If informa-
tion on product injuries is costly to obtain, we want to place liability
(other things the same) on the party who has the information or can
obtain it at lower cost."'8 6 An enterprise liability regime would force
manufacturers to generate and use the information to which they
have least-cost access.
Furthermore, even when classifying insureds according to
product use is cost-justified for insurers, actual investments in deter-
mining product risks will be inefficiently low. Individual insurers
would be unable to reap the full return on their investments in in-
formation because the information they generate cannot be pro-
tected.8 7 The information will, by necessity, be revealed in the
insurer's applications and policies. Suppose, for example, Insurer
One learns through costly investments in research that consumers
who use Type A lawnmowers face an increase in expected accident
costs of $50 per policy period over consumers who use Type B
lawnmowers and a $100 increase over those consumers who avoid
using lawnmowers altogether. When the insurer offers a $50 dis-
count to insureds who use Type B lawnmowers and a $100 discount
to insureds who do not use lawnmowers at all, Insurer One's com-
petitors will simply replicate Insurer One's policy discounts. The
insurer cannot force its competitors to pay for the valuable informa-
tion, so the insurer gives away the fruits of its costly research. Free-
riding competitors, because they can costlessly acquire the classifica-
tion information without the investor's consent and without com-
pensating the investor, can offer insureds comparatively low rates.88
quently valuable secrets, are ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the
general public.").
86 Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 549-50; see also G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at
163-64 (arguing that the party better able "to evaluate the accident risk ... is better
suited to bear the... loss .... [E]xternalization due to inadequate knowledge should be
avoided.").
87 "An insurance company will only undertake the cost of differentiation if it can
gain a competitive advantage by so doing." G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 61; see K.
ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 79; Sugarman, supra note 8, at 580.
88 Kenneth Arrow was first to make the point that private incentives to generate risk
information are plagued by the public good problem and are therefore less than socially
optimal. K. ARROw, supra note 35, at 150-52. A public good has two salient characteris-
tics: One party's consumption of the good does not preclude another from consuming
it, and once the good is produced, there is no efficient way of precluding another from
consuming it. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 13 (1989).
In the economics literature, the public good problem in contexts such as this is often
specifically referred to as the problem of "non-appropriability." R. COOTER & T. ULEN,
supra note 27, at 13. For more general discussions of this free-rider problem, see DAVID
K. WHrrcoMB, EXTERNALrrMES AND WELFARE (1972); George J. Stigler, Free Riders and
Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BEu.J. EcoN. & MGmrr.
Sci. 359 (1974).
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The problem of free-riding competitors would likely be much less
severe for manufacturers under an enterprise liability regime.89
There is an important, practical reason why insurers do not ad-
just premiums according to consumption choices. Suppose insurers
knew that the expected accident costs to an insured of consuming,
say, a 6.5 ounce can of chunk light tuna packed in spring water was
ten cents. How could insurers incorporate that information into
their policies? The insurer might, through its application, ask the
insured how many of those cans of tuna she expects to eat during
the policy period. The insurer could then adjust the premium ac-
cordingly. If the consumer is a tuna lover (or just a big eater) and
expects to eat 100 cans, her premium will be raised by $10. But if
her premium is raised just because she loves tuna, then she will have
an incentive to understate her expected level of tuna consumption.
Because the insurer has no way of cost-justifiably monitoring the
insured's consumption of tuna, the information about the expected
accident costs of tuna will have little or no value to the insurer.90 To
the extent that insurers cannot monitor insureds, incentives will not
be appropriately transmitted and insurance pools will suffer from
moral hazard and adverse selection.9 1 For these reasons and others
discussed below,92 first-party insurance pools are less than optimally
segregated according to insureds' consumption choices.93 Ideally,
first-party insurers would adjust insurance premiums with each con-
89 See infra note 129.
90 See supra text accompanying notes 75-78 (explaining that insurers do very little
classifying of insureds according to even cigarette consumption).
91 Cf Patricia M. Danzon, Comment on Landes & Posner: A Positive Economic Analysis of
Products Liability, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 574 (1985).
92 See infra note 126 (discussing asset-specific nature of certain insurer investments)
and Section II(D)(1) (first-party insurance externality is heightened by fact that manufac-
turers change the design of their products in response to first-party insurers' incentives
and by fact that insurers must bargain with insureds to generate optimal consumer care).
93 This practical problem confronting insurers may have played an important role
in encouraging the trend toward enterprise liability. See, e.g., Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 287, 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (1980) ("This court adopted strict liabil-
ity in tort in product liability cases partly because 'the seller is in the paramount position
to distribute the costs of the risks created by the defective product he is selling. He may
pass the cost on to the consumer via increased prices.'" (quoting Dippel v. Sciano, 37
Wis. 2d 443,450, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58 (1967))). According to Professor Priest, the move-
ment in products liability toward enterprise liability was based, in part, on the presumed
benefits of manufacturer provided insurance:
It is advantageous to spread the risks of product injuries broadly through
insurance in order to reduce the incidence of loss to any specific individ-
ual. Risk spreading can best be provided by manufacturers, rather than
by consumers in private insurance markets, because manufacturers can easily
collect a small insurance premium in the price charged for the product.
Priest, supra note 16, at 520 (emphasis added); see also Priest, supra note 17, at 1559
("Courts justified third-party insurance coverage based on how easy it seemed to be for
manufacturers or service providers to aggregate risks by adding an insurance premium
to the price of the product or service.").
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sumption choice insureds make. If an insured bought one can of
tuna, her premium would increase by ten cents. And if she bought
five, her premium would increase by fifty cents. It is fairly obvious,
however, that monitoring costs and transactions costs preclude such
adjustment by first-party insurers.9
Notice, however, that an enterprise liability regime could adjust
insurance premiums through the market price of the product at a
much lower cost-indeed, at practically no cost. Manufacturers
would simply add ten cents to the cost of every 6.5 ounce can of
chunk light tuna packed in spring water, and consumers would auto-
matically pay an adjusted insurance premium with every can they
buy.95
b. Classifying According to Individual-Risk Characteristics.
We have argued that first-party insurance fails to classify in-
sureds according to the products they consume, how many of those
products they consume, and how carefully they consume them. We
have also offered several reasons to explain why risk pools under
first-party insurance, unlike those that would exist under enterprise
liability, are inefficiently broad with regard to consumption choices.
Sections II, III, and IV below explore the deterrence implications of
this failure of first-party insurance. But focussing for now exclu-
sively on insurance considerations, it is fairly clear that this failure will
lead to inefficient degrees of moral hazard, cross-subsidization, ad-
verse selection, and unravelling in first-party insurance pools. Thus,
it seems that, as compared to enterprise liability qua insurance, first-
party insurance leaves much to be desired.96
One could respond to this conclusion by arguing that first-party
insurance, unlike enterprise liability. qua insurance, segregates con-
sumers according to other relevant individual-risk characteristics
94 Wi have recently been made aware of an interesting exception to this conclu-
sion. American Express now charges nothing for its cardholders to enroll in its "Bag-
gage Delay and Loss Protection Insurance Plan." Instead, American Express charges a
$4.75 premium per one-way airline ticket purchased. The insured is billed with each
airline ticket she charges on her American Express account. This exception, however,
actually supports our argument. If it were economically feasible for first-party insurers
to adjust premiums-as it is for American Express in this example-then they would
probably do a much better job than they currently do of adjusting premiums according
to consumption choices.
95 See generally Note, Controlling Health Care Costs by Controlling Technology: A Private
Contractual Approach, 99 YALE LJ. 1113 (1990) (authored by Paul E. Kalb) (citing these
reasons to explain the failure of insurers to adjust premiums according to costs of cer-
tain medical technologies); Steven Waldman, The Insurance Mess, NEwswK. 46-50 (Apr.
23, 1990) (describing how first-party insurers have been passive in response to increas-
ing insurance costs).
96 For a more detailed explanation of how enterprise liability would optimize con-
sumption choices, see infra Sections II and III.
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such as age97 or income.98 A consumer's income is relevant in the
products liability context because, for the same product-caused dis-
ability, the lost-income component-typically one of the two largest
components of products liability damages99-may be greater for
consumers with higher incomes. Under an enterprise liability re-
gime, there is a potential inefficiency: low-income consumers (or
more generally, consumers who would have relatively low damages
if injured) would, in buying a product, subsidize high-income (or
high-damage) consumers. Such cross-subsidies would not only be
inefficient, they would also be distributively unjust. The poor and
low-income person would be required to pay the same price up
front but would, on average, receive less compensation were they
later injured by the product.100 This view, however, has two funda-
mental problems.
The first problem is that most first-party insurers do not make
a significant effort to discriminate among insureds according to their
individual-risk characteristics (again, these are characteristics be-
sides consumption choices that affect the expected injury costs of
insureds). A majority of health insurance policies, for instance, are
provided through large group policies as an employment benefit.10'
Those group policies provide the same coverage for the same pre-
mium to very large groups of individuals. 0 2 Thus, there is likely a
significant variance of risk characteristics among the insureds of
such pools.' 0 3 The same is likely true of life insurance, roughly forty
97 An insured's age is relevant inasmuch as it affects the severity of injury. Cf PA-
TRICiA M. DAN ON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 21-24 (1985) (describing relationship be-
tween age of injured and severity of injury).
98 See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 69.
99 Priest, supra note 17, at 1559.
100 Id. at 1558-59.
101 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE ETHI-
CAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICE 162 (1983)
[hereinafter SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE] ("Most Americans who have private
health insurance obtain it through the workplace . in the form of employment-
based group insurance.).
102 Id. at 163:
The fact that most health insurance is purchased through the workplace
has spread the cost of care for workers and their families more evenly
across differences in health status than it would otherwise tend to be. (A
private insurance market will tend to sort insureds into groups by risk
class so that those at higher risk pay higher premiums).
103 Id. at 165-67:
[M]ost workers have had little or no choice in health insurance coverage
because their employers offered only one plan . . . . Presumably, em-
ployee preferences influence the type of plan offered at each workplace,
but preferences must be averaged over the entire group. In 1977, of the
62 million people with employment-related group health insurance only
18% were offered more than one plan. And even they still did not have
the range of choice they could expect on the open market.
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percent of which also is provided through employer-employee (and
other general) group plans.'04 Absent the necessary empirical sup-
port, scholars are wrong to merely assert that first-party insurers can
(or do) optimally segregate insureds according to their individual-
risk characteristics. 0 5 The second problem with the view that first
party insurance is superior to enterprise liability qua insurance is ex-
plained in the following subsection.
3. Enterprise Liability: More Efficient than Scholars Assert
a. The Conventional Wisdom.
Scholars typically assume that, for individual-risk characteris-
tics, enterprise liability qua insurance would be unable to narrow
consumer risk pools.' 0 6 This is supposedly true because in a market
economy manufacturers must sell their products to whoever is will-
ing to pay the market price and cannot discriminate among purchas-
ers according to their income, age, or other individual-risk
characteristics. 07 Some argue further that manufacturers' inability
to discriminate among consumers may create inefficient cross-
subsidies. 08
Other scholars emphasize that this inability to discriminate may
also lead to a form of adverse selection.' 0 9 If an enterprise liability
regime were implemented, the argument goes, individuals might al-
ter their consumption patterns to take advantage of the resulting
price differentials.11 0 Certain products would-before enterprise li-
See also P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 46, at 157-58 (describing the significant cross-subsidies
that exist in Blue Cross Blue Shield risk pools, and explaining why the breadth of those
pools creates allocative inefficiencies).
104 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BooK, supra note 79, at 30-31.
105 See generally Roger Feldman, Health Insurance in the United States: Is Market Failure
Avoidable?, 54 J. RisK & INS. 298 (1987); see also infra note 126 (explaining why insurers
will invest suboptimally in assessing highly specific individual-risk characteristics).
106 Professor Priest argues that enterprise liability qua insurance is "substantially less
effective" than first-party insurance at segregating risk pools. Priest, supra note 20, at
17. Priest argues that: "[viery little information about individual risks ... is available to
third-party insurers.... mhe manufacturer must sell the product on equivalent terms
to all who wish to buy it, and cannot distinguish among consumers . . . in product
price .... Priest, supra note 17, at 1557-59, 1585-86; see also Calabresi, supra note 32, at
837, 83942; Schwartz, supra note 26, at 405-06.
Professor Epstein concedes in passing that "[m]ore accurate insurance premiums
might be set by tying mandatory coverage to a rate structure that takes into account
certain differences among insureds; age, sex marital status, and the like." Epstein, supra
note 26, at 652. But he gives little thought to the possible inefficiencies of inaccurate
insurance premiums, concluding that "these details need not detain us." Idr
107 See Priest, supra note 17, at 1558 (auto manufacturer cannot implement risk dis-
tinctions and must pass on liability costs through vehicle prices).
108 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 556-57.
109 See authorities cited infra note 113.
110 For an explanation of why high-risk consumers would be unwilling to shift con-
sumption patterns in this way when the product accidents for which manufacturers must
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ability-have been consumed primarily by consumers with relatively
low individual-risk characteristics. 1 1 Manufacturers of these prod-
ucts would-after enterprise liability is initiated-be able to charge a
relatively low price because their products would, all else equal, en-
joy comparatively low expected liability costs.' 12 Consumers with
relatively high individual-risk characteristics, attracted by the lower
prices, might begin to consume such products. This shift by high-
risk consumers from more expensive to less expensive products
would be a form of adverse selection. 31
b. Debunking the Conventional Wisdom.
The conventional wisdom is that enterprise liability is inefficient
because it leads to cross-subsidies and adverse selection and that it
is unjust because, in essence, it requires low-income consumers to
pay a regressive tax when they buy a product. This view depends
entirely on two (typically unstated) assumptions: (1) that a manufac-
turer cannot design, package and market its product so that the
product will be consumed by individuals with relatively homogene-
ous individual-risk characteristics; and (2) that a manufacturer must
charge the same price to all consumers regardless of the consumers'
individual-risk characteristics. These assumptions, however, are
based on an erroneous oversimplification of consumer-product
markets.
For starters, it seems unimaginable that any product would ever
be consumed by a random selection of the general population. Cas-
ual empiricism suggests that most products are consumed by rela-
tively homogeneous subsets of the population-as defined by
income, gender, age, and the like. 114 Consider the injuries-
whatever they might be-that bowling balls and golf balls cause
their consumers." 5 It seems that the subset of the population con-
suming golf balls (and we all know how painful that can be) exhibits
compensate injured consumers contain a significant nonpecuniary component, see Cro-
ley & Hanson, supra note 15, at Part II(B)(4).
111 E.g., consumers who have below average income.
112 In anticipation of the following Sections we should now observe that after the
initiation of enterprise liability, price differentials would occur for a second reason.
Manufacturers of "inherently safe products" (a product is "inherently safe" or inher-
ently safer than others when, controlling for consumer care and activity levels, it poses
less risk) would be able to charge a relatively low price because their liability costs would
be lower than that of their competitors. This price differential would encourage an effi-
cient shift in consumption patterns from riskier to safer products.
113 GEORGE EADs & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RE-
SPONSE TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 16 n.6 (1983); Priest, supra note 17,
at 1564; Calabresi, supra note 32, at 837; Epstein, supra note 26, at 650-52.
114 Unfortunately, there is no way to fully test the narrowness of consumer-risk
pools under enterprise liability without first adopting such a regime.
115 Sporting equipment is used as an example because it is a type of product for
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significantly different risk characteristics than the subset consuming
bowling balls. For instance, it is probably true, though there are
undoubtedly exceptions, that golfers tend to have higher incomes
than bowlers. Furthermore, even among golfers, different brands of
golf balls attract still narrower groups of consumers. Relatively low-
income golfers tend to use Wal-Mart Floaters, whereas high-income
golfers tend to use Titlest X-100 Blacks. Similarly, female golfers
would be more likely to use Lady Titlests, whereas male golfers
would likely use high-compression Golden Rams. This point can be
stated more generally: Because demand for any product is to a
greater or lesser extent a function of consumer characteristics such
as income, age, gender, and taste, most products will, in terms of
those characteristics, be consumed by some nonrandom portion of
the population at large.
It should be remembered that not only do products naturally
attract relatively homogeneous consumer groups, but manufactur-
ers actually design their products with a view to attracting particular
sets of consumers' 16 Manufacturers do not produce products that
are perfectly homogeneous and perfectly substitutable." 17 Instead,
which third-party insurers are said to have instituted drastic increases in insurance pre-
miums. See Priest, supra note 17, at 1521 (citing newspaper article).
116 Professor Priest's ultimate claim that enterprise liability qua insurance cannot
narrow consumer risk pools, see supra note 106, is perplexing, in light of his description
of how manufacturers of four-wheel drive vehicles have responded to liability for con-
sumer injuries:
Manufacturers have been held liable.., for injuries suffered when these
vehicles have rolled or flipped in contexts of extreme mountain driving
on grounds that the manufacturer could either design the product to bet-
ter protect the consumer or insure the consumer for the loss.
Manufacturers must respond to this increased liability either by
changing product design to protect drivers in extreme conditions or by
increasing insurance coverage for the consumer set as a whole. Whether
the manufacturer changes the design or merely increases insurance cov-
erage, product costs will increase and the product price will increase.
The price increase, of course, may seem desirable for consumers who
drive in extreme backroad conditions. But consumers who purchase
four-wheel drive vehicles for other purposes-say, easier driving on
snowy or muddy roads-may not find the increased price worthwhile.
These consumers could be lured away if they were offered a four-wheel
drive vehicle suitable for snow and mud, but not for extreme grades
which, if only because of the lower attendant insurance premium, could
be offered at a lower price. It is not surprising that many manufacturers
have begun offering van and station wagon models with a four-wheel
drive option.
Priest, supra note 17, at 1565.
117 Interestingly, some legal economists have come to believe that even corporate
stocks traded on major stock markets are far from perfectly substitutable. See, e.g., Lynn
Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums?: Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law,
99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990). This suggests that consumer products, because they vary on
many more dimensions than do corporate stocks, may be even less substitutable. See id.
at 1243 & n.42.
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each manufacturer differentiates its product or brand of product
from that of other manufacturers: "Each seller tries to make its
product a little different, by altering the physical makeup of the
product, the services it offers, and other such variables. Other dif-
ferences ... are based on brand name, image-making, advertising
claims, and so forth."' 1 8 Manufacturers can, through market re-
search, collect much the same data concerning consumers' risk char-
acteristics that first-party insurers collect through insurance
applications. Therefore, manufacturers can with at least some suc-
cess segregate consumers by income, age, gender, taste, etc.,119
such that a reasonably homogeneous group of consumers uses each
distinct product. 120
A glance down the cookie aisle of typical American grocery
store will reveal the lengths to which product manufacturers are
willing to go to appeal to the particularized tastes of relatively nar-
row consumer groups.12' One finds everything from the relatively
sophisticated and expensive Pepperidge Farm Distinctive Mint Mila-
nos to the inexpensive, generic ginger snaps. Between those ex-
tremes, there are countless brands and varieties, each of which
seems to be manufactured and packaged with a relatively narrow
consumer group in mind. By brand, Sunshine Cookies seem to be
relatively low-end, while Keebler Cookies seem to be more toward
the high-end. And each brand offers many varieties. Nabisco, for
example, offers an array of cookie alternatives from Fig Newtons to
Animal Crackers to Oreos. 122 Beyond all this, many more brands
and types of prepackaged cookies are available outside grocery
118 EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONoMIcs 312 (4th ed. 1982). For a recent review of
the literature on the motivations for and the effects of product differentiation, see STE-
PHEN MARTIN, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 288-307 (1988).
119 Marketers also "target" segments of the population according to
psychographics, which classifies consumers by attitudes and values. Zachary Schiller,
Stalking the New Consumer, Bus. WK. 54, 57 (Aug. 28, 1989).
120 Poor consumers, for instance, often purchase products in distinct markets. See
generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDrr AND
RETAIL SALES OF DIsTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS (1968); Kunreuther, Why the PoorMay
Pay More for Food: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence, 46J. Bus. 368, 375-78 (1973). For a
recent discussion of how consumer-product manufacturers market their products to nar-
rowly defined consumer groups, see id. See also DOUGLAS F. GREER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 36-74 (2d ed. 1984); S. MARTIN, supra note 118; F.M.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 375-405 (2d ed.
1980).
For an example of how gun manufacturers, under enterprise liability, would differ-
entiate their products to narrow consumer risk pools, see Comment, supra note 62, at
376-78. See also Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 563 (conceding that "[i]f... it were
possible to identify a class of guns used mainly for illegal purposes (perhaps 'Saturday
night specials'), a stronger case could be made for [enterprise] liability as a method of
trying to price them off the market").
121 This practice is aptly referred to by those in the industry as "micro-marketing."
122 Indeed, there are now four types of Oreos: Standard Oreos, Fudge Covered
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stores at gourmet shops, health-food stores, imported-food stores,
and the like. Those stores themselves tend to appeal to fairly homo-
geneous groups of consumers.
In addition to offering diverse selections of products and pack-
ages, manufacturers engage in other fine-tuned advertising and
marketing techniques. To reach particular audiences, for instance,
manufacturers advertise at a particular time of day on a health-re-
lated Cable channel or in a special section of a professional wres-
ding magazine. Manufacturers also sponsor sporting events, and
other events-such as the Annual Pepto-Bismol Chili-Cooking Con-
test-which you would think would attract a relatively narrow subset
of consumers. 123 Manufacturers now even advertise on such places
as the walls of high-school lunch rooms and the blood-pressure
monitors in pharmacies.' 24 Moreover, they employ sophisticated di-
rect marketing techniques such as those offered through Computer-
ized Marketing Technologies Inc. ("CMT"):
[CMT] sends out millions of detailed consumer questionnaires.
As a result CMT now has data on the product usage, hobbies,
travel habits, and other facts for 25 million households. It mails
coded coupons three times a year to 15 million households and
can deliver different coupons to different consumers. 125
Notice that through the use of rebates or coupons manufacturers
not only can target very narrow subsets of consumers but also can
offer larger or smaller discounts to different consumers according to
those consumers' individual-risk characteristics. 126
Oreos, Oreo Double Stuffs, and Oreo Big Stuffs-each of which is available in at least
two package sizes.
123 -Schiller, supra note 119, at 56.
124 Id at 54.
125 Id at 57-58.
126 See Steven P. Croley, Less-Than-Strict Liability for Contraceptive Manufactur-
ers?: Scrutinizing Comment K (unpublished manuscript on file with authors) (contra-
ceptive manufacturers can create reasonably narrow consumer risk pools).
It might be argued that, although first-party insurers lack a comparative advantage
for segregating according to age, income, gender, and the like, they are better able than
manufacturers to segregate according to highly specific individual-risk characteristics.
For example, insurers might conduct detailed physical and psychological examinations
to assess an insured's chances of being injured in an accident. In fact, first-party insur-
ers rarely engage in such detailed analyses. Perhaps that is true because these sorts of
examinations represent costly transaction-specific investments. See generally Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 233 (1979). Once an insurer has made these investments, the insured has an
incentive to behave opportunistically by threatening to find insurance elsewhere, unless
the insurer lowers its rate to some level below what would be necessary for the insurer to
recoup its sunk investments. Because first-party insurance contracts are short-term, in-
sureds have the opportunity to defect, leaving insurers unable to obtain sufficient re-
turns to justify making the asset-specific investments in the first place. Ex ante, therefore,
first-party insurers have less than optimal incentives to make such investments.
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Another way in which manufacturers can segregate consumer
risk pools is through the use of warnings. By alerting those consum-
ers especially susceptible to the product's risks, a manufacturer may
be able to discourage high-risk consumers from using their product.
Consider, for example, the warnings to pregnant women regarding
the particular dangers posed by their smoking.1 27
Finally, it is worth observing now, in anticipation of the upcom-
ing Sections on deterrence, that manufacturers not only can segre-
gate consumers according to risk but also can lower the risk facing
consumers by improving their products' safety.' 28 To enhance
safety, manufacturers could, for instance, alter their manufacturing
processes or the designs of their products.' 29 Because manufactur-
ers would be liable for all the costs under an enterprise liability re-
gime, they would have optimal incentives to ascertain the costs and
benefits of alternative designs. 30
127 Of course, warnings will work only to the extent that consumers are not fully
compensated for losses. See infra Section IV(B)(2)(a). For a discussion of warnings, see
S. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 60-61; Alan Schwartz, Views on Addiction, 75 VA. L. REv. 509
(1989).
128 Cf supra note 112.
129 [M]ost instances of product-related harms are those in which precaution
lies unilaterally with the manufacturer. It is he who is in control of the
design of the product, of the manufacturing process, and it is he who is
most likely to be aware of any special dangers that the product presents
and, therefore, can most efficiently convey information about these dan-
gers through warnings.
R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 27, at 435. "IT]he manufacturer has virtually exclusive
access to much of the information necessary for effective control of dangers facing prod-
uct consumers." David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH.
L. REv. 1258, 1258 (1976); see also R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 166; Sugarman, supra note
8, at 580-81; Note, supra note 63, at 1061.
It could be argued that manufacturers may not invest optimally in researching and
developing safety features because of the fear that other manufacturers will free-ride on
the information generated by such investments. See supra note 88. This would place the
manufacturer who made the initial safety investment at a competitive disadvantage. The
free-rider problem, however, likely poses less of a problem in the manufacturing context
than it does in the first-party insurance context. Manufacturers will probably find it
quite costly to distinguish which of a given competitor's designs are safety features and
to determine how costly and effective those features in fact are. Insurers, on the other
hand, are able to capture all the relevant information merely by examining their compet-
itors' applications, policies and premium differentials. This task is easily accomplished
especially given the "very strong state regulatory pressure to standardize insurance poli-
cies." George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance, 63 TUL.
L. REv. 999, 1025 (1989). A more important factor is that manufacturers' designs, un-
like insurance applications, are readily protectable through patent, trademark, and trade
secret laws, which arguably were developed to protect against just this sort of free-rid-
ing. See generally Edward W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977).
130 Calabresi, supra note 32, at 839.
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C. Summary
We have argued that, contrary to the received wisdom, first-
party insurers fail, for several reasons, to segregate consumers effi-
ciently according to consumption choices. Additionally we have ar-
gued further that first-party insurance is probably less effective, and
enterprise liability is probably more effective, at segregating accord-
ing to individual-risk characteristics than has previously been sup-
posed. Whether enterprise liability qua insurance or first-party
insurance actually creates narrower risk pools (with regard to indi-
vidual-risk characteristics) is an empirical question that is beyond
the scope of this Article. Indeed, many of the relevant factors do
not, at least for the time being, lend themselves to empirical evalua-
tion.131 The overall efficiency of enterprise liability qua insurance is
currently indeterminate; we have argued simply that it is plausible
(especially given the failure of first-party insurers to adjust premi-
ums according to consumption choices) that enterprise liability will
be superior in this regard. Our argument should cast significant
doubt on the unsupported assumption now being made by legal
economists that first-party insurance is a more efficient means of in-
suring consumers against the risk of product accidents than insur-
ance provided through enterprise liability. There is much at stake,
however, in the choice between liability rules beyond just the insur-
ance considerations focused on thus far. There are also the deter-
rence implications of the first-party insurance externality to
consider, and to those implications we now turn.
II
PRODUCT ACCIDENT DETERRENCE
This Section first expounds the deterrence goal of a products
liability regime. It then describes two causes (in addition to those
described in Section I) and examines the deterrence implications of
the first-party insurance externality. This Section next demon-
strates that, because of the failure of first-party insurance to classify
according to consumption choices, consumers externalize 3 2 the
costs of product accidents to first-party insurers. Finally, this Sec-
tion shows that, because first-party insurers fail to classify according
to consumption choices, consumers and manufacturers will (in the
absence of an efficient liability rule) externalize the costs of product
accidents. Sections III and IV then attempt to determine the effi-
cient liability rule. 33
131 See, e.g., supra note 114.
132 The term "externalize" is defined at note 138, infra.
133 Section I shows that one cannot say which of the alternative products liability
rules is superior with regard to insurance consequences. Sections II and III exclude
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A. The Deterrence Goal
The deterrence goal of products liability law is to minimize the
costs of product accidents, including the costs of preventing acci-
dents.'3 4 Consistent with standard models in the economics of tort
law, we assume that the costs of product accidents are a function of
three variables:' 35 the care taken by producers in manufacturing a
product ("manufacturer care levels"); the care taken by consumers
in using a product ("consumer care levels"); and the quantity of a
product purchased and sold ("activity levels").136 These variables
insurance considerations from their analyses and focus on the comparative deterrence
consequences of the alternative rules.
134 Minimizing the costs of accidents has become well accepted among law-and-eco-
nomics scholars as the central goal of tort law. Calabresi, for example, states "I take it as
axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of
accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents." G. CAABREsi, supra note 1, at 26; see also
John B. Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach to Products
Liability, 74 VA. L. REv. 677 (1988) (arguing that Dean Calabresi's cost minimization goal
should be the central policy goal of products liability).
135 Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 538. Most law-and-economics commentators
agree that a liability rule has two principal deterrence effects: the "activity level" effect
and the "care level" effect. Professor Priest is the one exception. See supra note 20.
These two effects correspond to the "standard distinction.., between taking more care
while engaged in a dangerous activity and reducing the amount of activity to lessen the
probability of an accident." Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 538. The activity level
effect is the change in the costs of accidents resulting from a change in the frequency
with which the injurer engages in the risky activity, holding care level constant. The care
level effect is the change in the costs of accidents resulting from a change in the amount
of care taken by the injurer, holding activity level constant. See generally S. SHAvELL, supra
note 10, at 5-32 (describing activity levels and care levels as two relevant variables in
comparing liability rules); Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 538 (same); Shavell, supra
note 23 (same). For earlier discussions of the distinction between activity- and care-level
effects, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort
Law, 15 GA. L. REv. 851, 871-77, 904-08 (1981); Polinsky, supra note 29, at 364-66 (for-
mally analyzing effects of manufacturer activity levels on costs of accidents); see also G.
CAtaBRxsi, supra note 1, at 73 (arguing that deterrence has two effects: "it creates incen-
tives to engage in safer activities" (the activity level effect); and "it encourages us to
make activities safer" (the care level effect).
136 This Article uses one term, "activity levels," to describe both the quantity of a
product consumers purchase and the quantity of a product manufacturers sell. Cf
Landes & Posner, supra note 23, 549-50 (describing why "activity level" may have special
meaning in products liability context). By defining activity levels in this way, we implic-
itly assume that products are either fully consumed after only one use or are consumed
in direct proportion to a consumer's level of use. To the extent that a product's useful
life is not a function of the consumer's level of use, however, there arises an alternative
meaning for the term "activity level," namely, the frequency with which a product is
used over the product's useful life ("frequency level"). A consumer can purchase one
compact disc, for example, and play the disk from one to 5000 times without reducing
the disk's useful life. To the extent that activity level can diverge from frequency level in
this way, the optimization of one does not necessarily imply the optimization of the
other. This divergencc causes what we call the "durable good problem." As discussed
below, frequency level can be understood as one component of consumer care level. See
infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text; cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 538
(defining consumer care to include "intensity of use").
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will be optimized 137 (i.e., the costs of product accidents will be mini-
mized) only when both manufacturers and consumers internalize138
the total accident costs that a product causes. 139 Only then will both
manufacturers and consumers have incentive to invest in lowering
accident costs-by increasing care levels and/or decreasing activity
levels-up to the point at which the marginal costs to society of such
investments equal the marginal benefits. 140 At that point, all cost-
justified investments will have been made, and the costs of accidents
will have been minimized. 141
B. A "No Liability" Regime Assuming No First-Party
Insurance
It is well accepted that any products liability rule will be efficient
if information and transaction costs are zero. 142 Even in the absence
137 A factor is "optimized" when it cannot be adjusted to lower the total cost of
product accidents. Once manufacturer care is optimized, an additional one dollar in-
vestment in manufacturer care will yield less than a one dollar reduction in expected
accident costs. The same is true of optimal consumer care. If activity levels are optimal,
the benefit from the last unit of the product consumed (produced) will equal the total
costs of that unit, including the expected accident costs. See P. DANzoN, supra note 97, at
10; W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 58-62; see also Brown, supra note 23, at 324-
27. When care levels and activity levels are all optimized, the sum of the costs of care,
the costs of reduced activity, and the costs of accidents will be minimized. Minimizing
this sum is the deterrence goal of tort law. See supra note 134.
138 To internalize costs is to include them fully in the decision calculus. To exter-
nalize costs, on the other hand, is to exclude them from the decision calculus. SeeJEssE
DUKEMINIER &JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 38-43 (2d ed. 1988); R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER,
supra note 47, at 442-43; R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 62. When we speak of consumers
externalizing the costs of product accidents through first-party insurance, we do not
mean to imply that consumers are not all required to pay more for their insurance as a
result of the externality. To be sure, insurance premiums rise to reflect the externality,
but the increase is general and unrelated to any specific action taken by any specific
insured. Thus it affects only an individual's decision to insure or not to insure. See supra
note 44. Once insured, an individual's consumption choices will not be affected by pre-
miums. Cf Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (provid-
ing classic statement of this problem); MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY AND
LIBERTY 121 (1982) ("[Any group which distributes to its members benefits which are
independent of their contributions (or largely so) is liable to be taken advantage of by
free riders.").
139 For a more complete discussion of this point, see generally R. POSNER, supra note
8, at 147-52; see also S. SHAvELL, supra note 10, at 51, 127.
140 A rational actor, if she internalizes the full costs and benefits of her activities,
will, to maximize her utility, engage in any activity until the marginal costs equal the
marginal benefits. Until that point is reached, she can always attain a higher level of
utility by adjusting her level of activity. R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra note 47, at 141-43;
E. MANSFIELD, supra note 118, at 51-56; P. SAMUELSON & W. NoRDHAus, supra note 88, at
414-15; Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
141 Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 539 ("[W]e want output, injurer care, and
victim care to be carried to the point where the last dollar in care (or foregone output)
yields a benefit of a dollar in reduced accident costs.").
142 This claim is widely known as the "efficiency prediction," presumably because
whatever liability rule is adopted, efficiency obtains. See generally Coase, supra note 140
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of a liability rule, the costs of accidents will be minimized because
manufacturers and consumers will contract for optimal safety.143
Furthermore, iftcontracting costs are positive, 144 a products liability
rule will still be unnecessary to minimize the costs of accidents: As
long as manufacturers and consumers are perfectly informed, the
price mechanism (driven by consumers' consumption choices) will gen-
erate the optimal levels of care and activity.
To understand how the price mechanism can generate optimal
deterrence, notice that the total price of any product equals the sum
of two elements: the product's market (or nominal) price plus the
expected accident cost to be caused by the product. Assume initially
that consumers are not insured against their expected accident
costs. Consumers will, under those circumstances, internalize a
product's total price and will, being rational, prefer to pay the low-
est possible total price. To lower the total price, consumers will
make all cost-justified investments in care. Thus consumer care
levels will be optimized. 145
Manufacturers competing for consumers will help lower the to-
tal price of their products by making all cost-justified investments in
their products' safety. Thus manufacturer care levels will be opti-
mized. Moreover, since consumers internalize the total price of
consuming each additional unit of a product, they will consume un-
til the marginal cost of the product (i.e., the price of one unit of the
product) equals the marginal benefit. Thus activity levels will be
optimized.146
(demonstrating that parties would, under these assumptions, bargain to mutually benefi-
cial agreements, regardless of liability rule).
143 S. SHAvELL, supra note 10, at 61; Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 539-40;
Schwartz, supra note 26, at 367.
144 See generally W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 280-84 (discussing high
cost of contracting); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTrrUTIONS OF CAPrTALISM
70 (1985). See also Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELLJ. ECON.
466, 468 (1980) ("[B]ecause of the costs involved in enumerating and bargaining over
contractual obligations under the full range of relevant contingencies, it is normally im-
practical to make contracts which approach completeness"); cf Ian MacNeil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassica and Relational Con-
tract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 354 (1978) (long-term, complex contracts become dysfunc-
tional if too rigid). Contracting costs are one form of transaction costs. We are
assuming that all other transaction costs (e.g., search costs) are zero.
145 By definition, cost-justified investments in care lower the total price of a product.
Care levels will be optimized when no further cost-justified investments in care can be
made.
146 See supra note 140; see also GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 70-72
(1987).
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C. A "No Liability" Regime Assuming Perfect First-Party
Insurance
This Section has assumed thus far that consumers are unin-
sured against the risks of product accidents. How would it affect the
deterrence analysis to assume, more realistically, that consumers are
covered for these risks through first-party mechanisms? 147
Assume initially that, although contracting costs exist, first-
party insurers have free access to product risk information and that
they are therefore able costlessly to segregate risk pools. Under
these assumptions, insurers will perfectly adjust premiums accord-
ing to every consumption choice of each insured. 148 Consumers will
then be induced through first-party insurance premiums to internal-
ize the expected accident costs associated with each of their con-
sumption choices. Optimal deterrence will obtain.
Note that by adjusting premiums according to consumption
choices (i.e., what products an individual consumes, how many of
those products she consumes, and how much care she takes when
consuming them) the insurer sees to it that all elements of deter-
rence (i.e., manufacturer care, activity levels, and consumer care, re-
spectively) are optimized. For any product, each consumer will
internalize the product's total price by paying to the manufacturer
the product's market price and by paying to the insurer (in the form
of an insurance premium) the expected accident cost resulting from
the consumer's consumption choices.' 49 As before, consumers in-
ternalizing a product's total price will prefer to pay the lowest possi-
ble total price. Again, consumers will make all cost-justified
investments in consumer care. Thus consumer care levels will be
optimized. Manufacturers, competing for consumers, will help
lower the total price of their products by making all cost-justified
investments in their products' safety. Thus manufacturer care levels
will be optimized. Just as they did in the absence of insurance, con-
sumers-now through both the market price and insurance premi-
ums-will internalize the total costs of consuming each additional
unit of a product. Consequently, they will consume until the margi-
nal cost of the product equals the marginal benefit. Thus activity
levels will be optimized. In sum, perfect first-party insurance
147 Again, it is assumed that all consumers are fully insured through first-party
mechanisms for the risks of product accidents. See supra note 23. We relax this assump-
tion somewhat at infra note 179.
148 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
149 See S. SHAvELL, supra note 10, at 195. See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at
48-49 (discussing perfect "general deterrence" that would result from perfect individu-
alization of risk).
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against product risks would facilitate, not impede, optimal
deterrence.
D. A "No Liability" Regime Given the First-Party Insurance
Externality
To demonstrate that first-party insurance could theoretically fa-
cilitate optimal deterrence, Part C assumed that first-party insurers
perfectly adjusted premiums according to consumers' consumption
choices. Such an assumption, however, is unjustifiable. Section
I(B) (2) (a) described several reasons for why first-party insurers fail
to classify efficiently according to insureds' consumption choices.' 50
This Section will describe two more.
1. Additional Sources of the First-Party Insurance Externality
a. Ex Post Reaction of Manufacturers Weakens Ex Ante
Incentives of Insurers to Classify.
Suppose ours were a no-liability regime (or any regime in which
the products liability standard places less than sufficient incentives
on manufacturers to optimize manufacturer care). Assuming that
this regime were not plagued by any of the problems described in
Section I, one might think that first-party insurers would fill the de-
terrence gap as described in Section II(C). A problem arises, how-
ever, inasmuch as manufacturers adjust their care levels in response
to the insurers' classifications. Although such adjustments are, in
one sense, desirable from a deterrence perspective, they neverthe-
less reduce the insurers' incentives to classify according to product
risks in the first place.
To see this point, consider the following example. Suppose
there are just two types of lawnmowers: Type A and Type B. As-
sume that the mowers are identical but for the level of care used in
manufacturing them. Type A mowers are efficiently safe, whereas
Type B mowers are inefficiently unsafe.' 5 ' Assume also that, if the
two mowers were manufactured with the same care, they would be
perfect substitutes for each other. Under a no-liability regime, mar-
ket prices will not reflect expected accident costs; hence, B mowers
will have a lower nominal price because the B manufacturers will
have lower costs. Assume finally that consumers are covered by
first-party insurance against the risks of lawnmower accidents. Now
if first-party insurers adjust insureds' premiums according to their
consumption choices, Type A mowers will be less expensive overall
150 See supra Section I(B)(2).
151 The Type B manufacturer, in other words, does not make all cost-justified invest-
ments in manufacturer care, whereas the Type A manufacturer does.
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(market price plus insurance premium) and Type B manufacturers
will have appropriate incentives to make their mowers efficiently
safe. So far, so good; first-party insurers, by classifying insureds ac-
cording to consumption choices, are creating incentives that opti-
mize manufacturer care.
The problem, however, is that first-party insurers themselves
are left with little ex ante incentive to measure and classify according
to the expected accident costs of the lawnmowers. Insurers would
make the necessary investments only when doing so would give
them a competitive advantage. 152 But insurers cannot enjoy the full
benefits of segregating consumers according to their choice of
lawnmowers because as soon as insurers adjust premiums, Type B
manufacturers have an incentive to make their product efficiently
safe. As B mowers become safer, any competitive advantage insur-
ers might have gained from investments in classification disappear.
Ex ante, then, first-party insurers have less than optimal incentives to
invest in this information. 153
b. Insurers Must Share with Insureds the Gains of Classifying
("Inducement Costs").
Another factor undermines first-party insurers' incentives to in-
vest in discovering efficiently safe consumption choices. To gain the
full benefits of such investments, insurers, once they have discov-
ered the optimal consumption choices, will have to find a way to
induce insureds to make them. But to induce insureds to make the
optimal choices, insurers must pass on to insureds-through pre-
mium discounts-some portion of the benefits of such discoveries
(this Article refers to the transfer of information from insurer to in-
sured as "inducement costs").
To understand this point, contrast the way an insurer could
profit from its discovery to the way a manufacturer under an enter-
prise liability regime could profit from, say, a patentable invention
that efficiently lowered its liability costs. Because the manufac-
turer's liability costs are reduced, it can maintain its price and
thereby enjoy a profit equal to the reduction in cost per unit sold.
The manufacturer's consumers would not share in the gains of the
invention. Insurers, however, are in a different boat. If an insurer
discovers a way for its insureds to cost-justifiably reduce their acci-
dent costs (e.g., they discover that if a pair of $25 goggles are warn
by insureds who use Type A lawnmowers, the expected accident
costs of those insureds can be reduced by $50, a net gain of $25),
152 See supra note 87.
153 This is another case of the nonappropriability problem.
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the insurer has to hand over some or all of those gains to the in-
sureds. Otherwise, the insureds will have no incentive to take the
liability-reducing action. In this example, it is not clear exactly how
much of the $50 the insurer would have to offer to the insured
before the insured would adjust her behavior and begin wearing the
goggles. But it is clear that the insurer would need to begin the
offers at some amount greater than the $25. Because the potential
gain requires the insured's cooperation, insurers and insureds will,
in effect, bargain over how the $25 in net gains should be split be-
tween them. Thus insurers must share the gains from their discov-
ery with their insureds (by reducing premiums) if they hope to
receive any portion of those gains for themselves. Because of these
inducement costs, first-party insurers ex ante have suboptimal incen-
tives to encourage their insureds to adopt efficient practices.154
2. The Adverse Deterrence Implications of the First-Party Insurance
Externality
For those reasons, in addition to the reasons described in Sec-
tion I, insurance premiums will not promote efficient accident-cost
reduction because premiums remain constant regardless of the con-
sumption choices of each insured.' 55 Neither the market price of
products nor first-party insurance premiums will force consumers to
internalize the expected accident costs associated with their con-
sumption choices. Therefore, consumers will not internalize the to-
154 See Henry Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus Stock, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 125, 147-48 (1985); cf Schwartz, supra note 79, at 357 ("mhe incen-
tives of the insured to accept [the insurer's safety] recommendations are unclear, since
its premium remains constant even if it implements the insurer's . .
recommendations.").
155 Moreover, the classification goals of insurers, when they do classify, are not nec-
essarily coextensive with the social goals of deterrence. Consider the classification varia-
ble sometimes used by health insurers: cigarette smoking. See supra notes 72-81 and
accompanying text. Since insurers are concerned with the correlational purpose of clas-
sification, they may over-deter cigarette smoking. That is, by increasing smokers' premi-
ums, insurers raise the total price of cigarettes to reflect not only their inherent risks but
also their correlated risks. Social deterrence goals, however, are concerned with causa-
tion, not correlation. Thus, to the extent correlation does not imply causation, insur-
ance classifications over-deter. Too few cigarettes will be smoked, while too many other
unsafe products (e.g., deep-fried chicken) will be consumed. This deterrence problem
results from the failure of insurers to classify solely on the basis of causation. The prob-
lem is mitigated by a liability rule, such as enterprise liability, that places costs on those
products that cause them. The problem remains, however, insofar as the liability system
is incapable of determining causation. See Viscusi, supra note 79, at 69-70, 73-74 (dis-
cussing difficulties courts face in determining cause of certain types of injuries). See gen-
erally Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J.
LEGAL S-rUD. 779 (1985) (analyzing problems of assigning liability and calculating dam-
ages based on probabilistic information); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass
Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HAtv. L. REv. 851 (1984)
(same).
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tal price of products' 56
The ability of consumers to externalize the costs of product ac-
156 One might argue that, if it is true that manufacturers-for any or all of the rea-
sons described--can provide more efficient product-risk insurance than first-party insur-
ers can, then first-party insurers should recognize their comparative disadvantage and
should, induced by market forces, adjust accordingly. First-party insurers should, the
argument goes, cease providing insurance against any product risks and should reduce
their premiums accordingly, with the expectation that manufacturers would be induced
to step in and fill the insurance gap. For several reasons, however, insurers would not
adopt this strategy.
First and most obviously, insurers would not follow this strategy because doing so
would require them to make the same research investments that this Article has already
argued they are, because of market failures, unwilling to make. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 82-94, note 126, and Section II(D)(1). Without such information, insurers
would not know how much to discount their premiums.
Second, even assuming that insurers somehow knew how much to reduce their pre-
miums, they would adopt this strategy only if all or most insurers were able to cooperate
in the decision such that enough consumers would demand manufacturer-provided
product-risk insurance to induce manufacturers to supply it. Such an outcome seems
highly unlikely given the number of participants in, and the relative competitiveness of,
the first-party insurance industry. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 46, at 166; Priest, supra
note 20, at 37; Winter, supra note 50, at 463-64. Absent such collusion, no single insur-
ance company will have incentive to exclude product-risks (or, for that matter, to offer
premium discounts to those who buy products with insurance), because they will take
the market as given. From the individual insurer's perspective, there will be nothing to
gain by cutting premiums in this way. Consumers will not want to forego their products
liability insurance from first-party providers because they will not be able to get insur-
ance from manufacturers. Manufacturers will not provide insurance to these few con-
sumers, because all other consumers will be unwilling to pay the added price given that
they are already insured. Cf Schwartz, supra note 26, at 371 (explaining that firms are
typically "responsive to the preferences of consumer groups, rather than the prefer-
ences of every consumer"). Thus, no insurer would adopt such a strategy because no
insurer, acting alone, would anticipate that its decision not to insure product risks would
have any effect on manufacturers' decisions to provide product-risk insurance. Put more
technically, the current regime-under which first-party insurers cover product risks, but
manufacturers, unless through tort law, do not-though inefficient, is a "Nash equilib-
rium." John F. Nash, Jr., Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sc.
48 (1950). For a simple explication of a "Nash Equilibrium," see P. SAMUELSON & W.
NoRDHAUs, supra note 88, at 630-31.
Moreover, even if insurers could collude to shift the equilibrium such that only
manufacturers provided product-risk insurance, why would they? That society would be
better off overall does not imply that first-party insurers would be. First-party insurers
would lose premiums and profits were they collectively to unload product risks onto
product manufacturers. The inefficiencies of the current equilibrium (like the inefficien-
cies of much special-interest regulation) are not likely to be eagerly corrected by those
who currently control and benefit from them.
Another reason insurers might not offer to exclude coverage for product risks is
that doing so would require insurers to investigate every claim in order to determine
whether the accident was product-caused. This would be an expensive process for in-
surers. Moreover, by adopting such a practice, insurers might damage their "good
hands" reputations when they fail to pay claims in hard-to-call cases. O'Mahoney Inter-
view, supra note 72; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: OF COASE,
NoRMs, AND SHASTA COUNTY (forthcoming 1991) (stating that insurers in Shasta County,
California usually prefer to settle claims rather than to invoke the law against claimants,
especially for small claims); H. LAWRENCE Ross, SETrLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL
PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTs 233-42 (1970) (describing insurer's reluc-
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cidents significantly undermines deterrence goals. First, consumer
care levels will be suboptimal. Consumers will be unwilling to in-
vest in consumer care because they will be compensated by first-
party insurers for their injuries; taking care would impose upon con-
sumers a cost with no offsetting benefit. Consumers, therefore, will
have no incentive to take care.' 5 7 For the same reasons, consumers
will be unwilling to pay any additional price to compensate manu-
facturers for investments in care. Competitive manufacturers will
refrain from making cost-justified investments in care. Thus manu-
facturer care levels will be suboptimal. 158 Finally, because consum-
ers externalize accident costs, they will consume beyond the point at
which the marginal costs of the product equal the marginal benefits.
Activity levels will therefore be too high. The failure of first-party
insurers to classify according to insureds' consumption choices,
then, ensures that none of the deterrence objectives will be met:
activity levels will be too high, care levels too low.
Section III demonstrates that, notwithstanding the presence of
imperfect first-party insurance, an enterprise liability regime, but
not a negligence regime, would optimize two of the three deter-
rence objectives: activity levels and manufacturer care levels. Sec-
tion III then explains why the third deterrence objective, consumer
care levels, cannot be optimized under either liability regime. Fi-
nally, Section III shows that a defense of contributory negligence,
given the insurance externality, is inefficient and that an enterprise
liability rule should therefore not include such a defense.
III
OPTIMIZING DETERRENCE: CHOOSING AN EFFICIENT
PRODUCTS LIABILrrY REGIME, ASSUMING
INFORMATION IS PERFECT AND ALL
LOSSES ARE PECUNIARY
A. Enterprise Liability versus Negligence
Assume for the moment that all product accidents are "initially
preventable" (preventable at least cost by manufacturers). 159 Under
tance to withhold payments even when, by the terms of insurance contract, it was enti-
tled to).
157 The problem of consumer care levels is equivalent to the moral hazard problem
described above. See supra Section I(A)(1).
158 For a legendary example of this phenomenon, see Calabresi, supra note 32, at
838 n.20 (consumers unwilling to pay for automobile safety features because they had
insurance).
159 This implies that whenever manufacturers make all cost-justified investments in
care, all product accidents will be prevented; that is, accident costs will equal zero. It
follows that, under this assumption, optimal consumer care levels will equal zero. This
simplifying assumption is relaxed below. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
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an enterprise liability regime, manufacturers are required by law to
pay for the costs of all accidents caused by their products. There-
fore, to be competitive, manufacturers will minimize the total price
of their products by making all cost-justified investments in manu-
facturer care. Thus manufacturer care levels will be optimized. The
costs of these investments will be reflected in a product's market
price so that its market price will equal its total price. That is, a
product's market price will include the total unit cost to the manu-
facturer of producing the product, including the cost of all cost-jus-
tified investments in manufacturer care. Because manufacturers will
invest optimally in care, expected accident costs will equal zero.
Hence, consumers-through the market price-will internalize the
total price of consuming an additional unit of the product and will
consume until the marginal cost of the product equals the marginal
benefit. Thus, activity levels will be optimized. 160
A negligence regime 16 1 replicates this result only if one contin-
ues to assume that all accidents are initially preventable and that
courts perfectly ascertain and enforce optimal manufacturer care.
Under these circumstances, just as under an enterprise liability re-
gime, manufacturers will be required by law to pay the costs of all
accidents caused by their products. This follows because all acci-
dents, by assumption, result from manufacturer negligence (by as-
sumption, all are initially preventable). Therefore, for the same
reasons activity levels and manufacturer care levels were optimized
under enterprise liability, they would be optimized under negli-
gence. 162 However, if we relax our two assumptions, enterprise lia-
bility becomes a more efficient means of obtaining optimal
deterrence than negligence.
First, courts are not able to ascertain and enforce optimal manu-
facturer care. Indeed, it is generally accepted that, as compared to a
given manufacturer, courts are ill-suited to engage in the expost cost-
benefit analysis required to determine what precautionary measures
a manufacturer should have taken ex ante with regard to a given
product. 63 To make such a determination, a court would first have
160 S. SevELL, supra note 10, at 50-56; R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 161-64, 166.
161 Under a negligence regime, manufacturers are liable only for initially preventa-
ble product accidents. It is widely accepted that courts do not or cannot consider activ-
ity levels in their negligence analyses. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 23, at 25; Landes &
Posner, supra note 23, at 546; Priest, supra note 17, at 1537 n.90; Comment, A Time-
Dependent Model of Products Liability, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 209, 218-20 (authored by Peter V.
Letsou).
162 See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
163 I.e., what investments in manufacturer care were available and which of those
were cost-justified. S. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 56; see G. EAns & P. REUTER, supra note
113, at 17 ("risk-utility balancing test has ... forced the courts into an area that they are
not equipped to handle"); James A. Henderson, Jr.,Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Con-
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to calculate the relevant product's supply schedule. This alone
would be a formidable undertaking, as the court would have to esti-
mate both the production costs and the expected accident costs as-
sociated with each alternative product design. Second, the court
would have to calculate the demand schedule for each design by
estimating how much of the product consumers would purchase at
every price. Finally, the court would have to determine, based on
these calculations, which product design generates the largest con-
sumer surplus. Such determinations seem beyond the limits ofjudi-
cial competence. 164  A negligence regime, then, seems an
"unworkable" standard of liability in products cases. 165 Enterprise
liability, on the other hand, places all product accident costs on the
manufacturer, the party best able to obtain, evaluate, and imple-
ment the relevant information regarding a product's safety. Enter-
prise liability forces manufacturers to internalize accident costs and
thereby leads manufacturers to make all cost-justified investments in
care.
The second general reason why a negligence rule does not opti-
mize deterrence is that not all accidents are initially preventable.
Many accidents are either "unpreventable" (unable to be prevented
at a cost less than the expected accident cost)166 or "residually pre-
ventable" (preventable at least cost by consumers). Since, by defini-
scious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973) (courts not
suited to task of providing specific product-safety guidelines); Owen, supra note 129;
Schwartz, supra note 26, at 384-88 (describing the inability of courts to apply negligence
risk/benefit standard to manufacturers); see also Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to
Take Care Under the Negligence Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1989) (explaining that because
of difficulties courts face in determining optimal level of injurer care, courts should hold
manufacturers to higher level of care).
164 This description of what precisely a court must do to ascertain optimal manufac-
turer care paraphrases the insight articulated by Professor Schwartz. Schwartz, supra
note 26, at 386-87. Schwartz points out that manufacturers, too, would have difficulty
making these complicated calculations. However, as Schwartz would doubtless agree,
manufacturers need not construct demand and supply curves; they simply strive to maxi-
mize profit by whatever means necessary, and the market generates the optimal product
design and output. True, manufacturers will attempt to estimate both their expected
costs-a task they are in a better position to perform than anyone else-and their reve-
nues. But any manufacturer who fails to make the efficient choices will be competed out
of the market. This is the virtue of internalizing costs on manufacturers. See generally W.
Kip Viscusi, Wading through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, AM. U. L. REV. (1990) (ex-
plaining how "a competitive market will ensure that the product mix is optimal").
165 Schwartz, supra note 26, at 386. Schwartz prefers the term "risk/benefit test" to
the term "negligence," which he refers to as having an "unstated assumption that safety
expenditures made in connection with an activity do not affect the benefits consumers
derive from the activity." Id. at 385. But, as Schwartz would concede, if the costs of lost
consumer surplus are included in the definition of prevention costs-as is assumed in
this Article-then negligence is still the relevant standard. It is just a matter of
semantics.
166 The assumption is referred to at supra note 159.
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tion, a negligence regime holds manufacturers liable only for
initially preventable accidents, 167 a product's market price under a
negligence regime would not reflect the costs of unpreventable and
residually preventable accidents.
Nonetheless, if, as law-and-economics theorists have previously
assumed,168 consumers under a negligence regime were actually to
bear the costs of unpreventable and residually preventable acci-
dents, then activity levels would be optimized. In fact, however,
under a negligence regime consumers externalize the costs of all
residually preventable and unpreventable accidents. These costs
are instead paid by first-party insurers.169 The price consumers pay
for any given product, therefore, will be less than the product's total
price. 170 Accordingly, consumers will consume each product be-
yond the point at which the marginal total cost (including the costs
of residually preventable and unpreventable accidents) equals the
marginal benefit to the consumer. Thus activity levels will be too
high.
Enterprise liability, on the other hand, requires consumers-
even fully insured consumers-to internalize a product's total price.
This is because, as stated above, under enterprise liability a manu-
facturer is required by law to pay the costs of all accidents caused by
its product, including residually preventable and unpreventable ac-
cidents. Hence, consumers, through the market price, internalize
the total price of consuming an additional unit of the product and
will therefore consume until marginal cost equals marginal bene-
fit. t7 t Activity levels will thus be optimized.' 72
This Section has demonstrated that enterprise liability is supe-
rior to a negligence regime based on two deterrence objectives: ac-
tivity levels and manufacturer care levels. This Section, however,
has ignored the third deterrence objective: consumer care levels. 173
Neither of the two liability regimes, it turns out, is capable of opti-
mizing consumer investments in care, because neither requires the
167 See supra note 20.
168 See, e.g., W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 276 (discussing a caveat
emptor regime).
169 See supra Section I.
170 Polinsky, supra note 29.
171 But cf. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 503-14 (1961) (describing market conditions that might prevent price
of product from reflecting accident costs, but concluding that "it is fair to say that
cases where enterprise liability would enhance proper resource allocation greatly
predominate").
172 See supra note 140.
173 This Section has also ignored the durable good problem adumbrated above. See
supra note 136. The durable good problem can be thought of as a consumer care prob-
lem and the following analysis, which explicitly applies to consumer care, applies as well
to the durable good problem.
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consumer to internalize the costs of residually preventable acci-
dents. Under negligence, first-party insurers will compensate con-
sumers for those accidents; under enterprise liability, manufacturers
will. As a result, consumers will be compensated under either re-
gime, so that taking care imposes costs without providing offsetting
benefits. Therefore, consumers under either liability rule will have
no incentive to take care. The problem of suboptimal consumer
care levels, 174 therefore, is insuperable.' As Part B shows, even a
defense of contributory negligence cannot solve the consumer care
problem.
B. The Optimal Rule: Enterprise Liability Without a
Contributory Negligence Defense
Some scholars have argued that enterprise liability in conjunc-
tion with the defense of contributory negligence 175 will optimize all
deterrence objectives, including consumer care levels. 176 Assuming
courts can accurately determine when a consumer has been contrib-
utorily negligent, and that consumers fully internalize losses im-
posed on them by courts, enterprise liability plus contributory
negligence would indeed be the optimal products liability rule.
Under such a rule, manufacturers would prevent initially preventa-
ble accidents and insure consumers against unpreventable acci-
dents, and consumers would prevent residually preventable
accidents. Scholars supporting such a regime, however, have failed
to consider that consumers will still be insured by first-party insur-
ers against these risks. 177 Therefore, even if found contributorily
negligent by a court, consumers will be compensated by their insur-
ers. 178 As a result, the consumer care problem will persist. That is,
the use of contributory negligence does not alter the fact that first-
party insurance allows consumers to externalize residually preventa-
ble accidents. Contributory negligence, then, serves little or no use-
ful function because of the first-party insurance externality.' 79
174 I.e., the problem of moral hazard.
175 Under a regime of enterprise liability with a defense of contributory negligence,
courts hold manufacturers liable for the costs of all accidents except those that are
residually preventable.
176 See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 294, 300; S. SHAVELL, supra note 10,
at 52-53; Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 543; Schwartz, supra note 26, at 392.
177 First-party insurers compensate insureds for product-accident costs, even when
consumers have been found contributorily negligent. O'Mahoney Interview, supra note
72.
178 Id
179 We have noted above that contributory negligence and other tort doctrines
might serve a useful insurance function. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Again, this function is vitiated by the effects of first-party insurance. Contributory negli-
gence may have beneficial insurance effects to the extent that first-party insurance incor-
porates copayment features. Copayment features, however, are sometimes not
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Academics frequently complain that courts ignore the potential
role of consumers in preventing product accidents.18 0 The first-
party insurance externality, however, may justify the courts' ap-
proach. Designing rules to induce accident-reducing behavior on
the part of consumers is pointless when consumers, because of the
first-party insurance externality, would disregard such rules. Not
only will including the defense of contributory negligence provide
little if any benefit, but including the defense may have a significant
cost. That is, disallowing the defense of contributory negligence
serves a deterrence objective. If there is a defense of contributory
negligence, consumers will externalize to first-party insurers the
costs of residually preventable accidents. Such accidents, therefore,
will not be prevented.
Enterprise liability without the defense of contributory negli-
gence, on the other hand, imposes upon manufacturers the costs of
residually preventable accidents. Manufacturers will therefore in-
ternalize these costs and will prevent the subset of residually pre-
ventable accidents that are preventable by manufacturers. Put
differently, those accidents that are not initially preventable but are
nonetheless (cost-justifiably) preventable by increasing manufac-
turer care will be prevented if, and only if, there is no defense of
contributory negligence. Given that consumer care levels cannot be
optimized, disallowing a contributory negligence defense optimizes
manufacturer care levels. The first-party insurance externality es-
sentially raises the optimal care level of manufacturers above what it
would be in the absence of first-party insurance externality.
For these reasons, enterprise liability without contributory neg-
ligence is the liability rule that most efficiently deters product
accidents.181
employed. For example, prepaid health insurance plans such as health maintenance or-
ganizations (constituting 20% of private health insurance market) and publicly provided
plans such as Medicaid do not have copayment features. Thexton Interview, supra note
54. Likewise, life insurance policies never incorporate copayment features. Musco In-
terview, supra note 76. Moreover, when first-party insurers do employ copayment fea-
tures, they only require insureds to bear a small fraction of total losses. See supra notes
53-54 and accompanying text. And, for such policies, insureds can, and often do,
purchase some form of supplemental insurance to cover the costs that their primary
coverage leaves unpaid.
180 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 63, at 2199-213 (arguing that courts should not have
changed liability rules based on their faulty assumption that consumer care is irrelevant).
"The common law restrictions on freedom of contract are not justified by any concern
with externalities, or with duress, fraud, and incompetence of individual consumers."
Id at 2214. Maybe not, but Epstein has failed to consider the first-party insurance exter-
nality in his list of possible justifications, and it would justify the concern. See generally
Croley & Hanson, supra note 31 (offering market-failure justifications for common-law
restrictions on contract aspects of products liability law).
181 Another independent justification for employing an enterprise liability rule with-
out a defense of contributory negligence is that consumers are less likely than manufac-
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IV
RELAXING SOME ASSUMPTIONS
Previous Sections demonstrate that under certain assumptions
an enterprise liability regime may be the most efficient products lia-
bility regime. This Section will discuss whether relaxing the least
realistic of those assumptions significantly alters our conclusion.
Part A considers the effect of costly or imperfect consumer informa-
tion, and Part B considers the effect of nonpecuniary losses.
A. Optimizing Deterrence: Choosing a Products Liability
Regime Given that Consumers Are Imperfectly
Informed
Sections II and III assumed that consumers are perfectly in-
formed as to the risks inherent in their consumption choices. Con-
sumers are not perfectly informed, however, because information is
not free. 182 By "imperfect consumer information" we do not mean
that consumers systematically over- or under-estimate product
risks.18 3 As detailed below, imperfect consumer information means
turers to respond to the incentives created by liability rules. Epstein has argued that "it
is not surprising that virtually all nonlawyers are ignorant of the doctrinal dispute be-
tween negligence and strict liability .... The stakes simply are not high enough to spur
individuals to master common law rules before the occurrence of an accident." Richard
A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1717, 1744
(1982). Epstein doubts that limiting the defenses to manufacturer liability will be very
significant by arguing that "[t]he effect of "these financial incentives is difficult to deter-
mine, particularly in personal injury cases in which the plaintiffs' inherent instincts of
self-preservation play a central role." Id. at 1741; see also Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and
Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (1990); Howard A.
Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 677 (1985);
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Negligence Reconsidered- The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1980) (distinguishing between rational and non-rational decision-mak-
ers); cf Fleming James, Jr. & John J. Dickenson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63
HAtv. L. REV. 769, 780 (1950) (a system of absolute liability will not increase prevention
pressure on the individual).
182 Landes and Posner emphasize this point. Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at
536.
183 For justifications of enterprise liability based on systematic consumer mispercep-
tions, see, e.g., Epple & Raviv, supra note 29; Victor P. Goldberg, The Economics of Product
Safety and Imperfect Information, 5 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sc. 683 (1974); Walter Y. Oi,
The Economics of Product Safety, 4 BELLJ. EcON. & MGmrr. Sc. 3 (1973); Polinsky & Roger-
son, supra note 29; Carl Shapiro, Consumer Information, Product Quality and Seller Reputation,
13 BELLJ. EcON. 20 (1982); Marilyn J. Simon, Imperfect Information, Costly Litigation, and
Product Quality, 12 BELL J. ECON. 171 (1981); Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions,
Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. EcON. STUD. 561 (1977); see also P. DANZON,
supra note 97, at 14-15 (summarizing the argument in the market for physician services).
See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 56-58 (1970) (discussing consumers inability
to value risk property). Professor Alan Schwartz has argued that the level of consumer
information may be irrelevant to the level of safety attributes (i.e., manufacturer care
levels) provided in products. He argues that as long as consumers do not err systemati-
cally in their (albeit uninformed) estimates of product safety, the market will operate as
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simply that because information is costly, consumer estimates of
product risk will necessarily be based on less than perfect informa-
tion and therefore consumer estimates will at some level be
imperfect.
By analyzing the implications of imperfect consumer informa-
tion, this Section offers additional support for an enterprise liability
regime. The intuition underlying this argument is reasonably
straightforward: Enterprise liability is the only liability regime that
includes the total costs of accidents in a product's market price. Be-
cause the price includes the total costs of a product, the price in
effect informs consumers of the product's risks.184
1. The Deterrence Goal Re-examined
Given our assumption that consumers are imperfectly in-
formed, it is useful to disaggregate "activity levels" into "manufac-
turer activity levels" and "consumer activity levels." Under this
slightly altered taxonomy, the costs of product accidents will be a
function of four variables: (1) the care taken by producers in manu-
facturing a product ("manufacturer care level"); (2) the care taken
by consumers in using a product ("consumer care level"); (3) the
total quantity of the product sold ("manufacturer activity level");
and (4) the quantity of the product purchased by each consumer
("consumer activity level"). As described in Section II, the costs of
a product's accidents will be minimized when these variables are op-
timized, that is, when both manufacturers and consumers internalize
the total accident costs caused by the product.
2. The Failures of a "No Liability" Regime
As already discussed, the market, even in the absence of a liabil-
ity rule, will minimize the costs of accidents so long as information is
perfect and transaction costs are zero. As this subsection shows,
however, if consumers are imperfectly informed, there are two rea-
sons why optimal deterrence may not obtain.
if consumers were perfectly informed. And although some scholars have long held the
view that consumers indeed tend to be systematically optimistic concerning product
hazards, see, e.g., G. CAI.ABRESI, supra note 1, at 56, more recently Professor Schwartz has
argued that consumers in the aggregate tend to behave as if well-informed. Schwartz,
supra note 26, at 374-84.
184 W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 294; Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at
550; see also id. at 555-56 ("[flnformation about risk is impounded in the higher price and
"communicated" to the consumer in a form that he can understand without investing in
costly information."); Schwartz, supra note 26, at 399 ("The price... will more accu-
rately reflect... accident costs, thereby better informing consumers of the risk... (just
as a warning would)."); cf. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM.
ECON. REv. 519 (1945) (describing how prices convey information); G. CALBtREsi, supra
note 1, at 69-72 (same); Note, supra note 63, at 1062-63 (1988) (same).
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a. The "Unravelling" of the Market for Manufacturer Care.
The following example illustrates the first form of welfare loss
resulting from imperfect consumer information. Suppose that there
are two brands of mousetrap: Initially there are only Widgets, but at
some later time Gidgets are added to the market. 185 Suppose fur-
ther that a mousetrap's safety is a function only of its manufacturer's
cost-justified investments in care, investments that are unobservable
to consumers because of information costs. We assume for pur-
poses of illustration that all accidents are preventable at least cost by
manufacturers.1 86 Suppose that Widgets, before the advent of
Gidgets, are efficiently safe; that is, the Widget manufacturer makes all
cost-justified investments in care, and the expected cost of Widget
accidents therefore equals zero. Assume that the initial market price
of Widgets equals their marginal cost. Suppose now that another
mousetrap manufacturer begins cranking out Gidgets. Assume that
Gidgets are inefficiently unsafe; that is, the Gidget manufacturer makes
no cost-justified investments in care, and the expected cost of
Gidget-accidents therefore is maximized. Finally, assume that be-
cause of information costs consumers cannot compare the relative
safety of Widgets and Gidgets. At best consumers can only estimate
the average risk of all mousetraps on the market, Widgets and
Gidgets combined. As a result of their being indistinguishable,
Widgets and Gidgets will be sold at the same market price despite
the fact that Widgets, being efficiently safe, will have a lower total
price. As shown below, that consumers cannot ascertain the total
price of a particular brand of mousetrap causes the market for safety
to "unravel."' 187 The Widget manufacturer, in other words, loses
some or all of its incentive to invest in care.
Because the Gidget manufacturer initially has lower production
costs (since it makes no investments in care), and because it sells its
traps at the same market price as Widgets, the Gidget manufacturer
enjoys comparatively high profits. The Widget manufacturer, to
maximize profits and to stay competitive, will, in response, lower its
costs by reducing investments in manufacturer care.' 8 The market
price of all mousetraps-Widgets and Gidgets alike-will decrease
because the average investment in manufacturer care (which con-
sumers ex hypothesis perceive correctly) decreases. As the market
price starts downward, the need increases for the Widget manufac-
185 Widgets, of course, are produced by Acme Manufacturing Inc. while Gidgets are
produced by AAA Manufacturers Consolidated.
186 Le., all accidents are initially preventable.
187 See supra Section I(A)(3).
188 Notice that if all mousetraps were produced by a monopolist this deterioration in
manufacturer care would not result.
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turer to cut costs by reducing investments in care. As investments in
care decline, the market price continues downward. And so it goes:
The market for safe Widgets unravels. No mousetrap manufacturer
will have incentive to make efficient investments in safety, because
any manufacturer with greater than average costs will be competed
out of the market. Thus, to be competitive, the Widget manufac-
turer must reduce its investment in manufacturer care to zero such
that Widgets become identical to Gidgets. Because of the informa-
tional asymmetry, then, the market for efficiently safe Widgets dis-
appears altogether. 189 Emerson, after pondering this dismal result,
might have concluded that if a person makes a better mousetrap, the
world will beat a path to her competitor's door.'90
This unravelling result can be more generally stated: if consum-
ers cannot perfectly distinguish safe from unsafe brands of a given
product-type, and if the liability rule does not hold manufacturers
liable for the accidents that the manufacturer could have prevented
at least cost, the safety (i.e., manufacturer care levels) of that prod-
uct-type, and the safety of each and every brand of that product
type, will be inefficiently low.
b. Non-Optimal Consumer Activity Levels.
The following example illustrates a second welfare loss result-
ing from the fact that consumers are imperfectly informed. Assume
in this example that there is only one brand of mousetrap, say,
BoDidgets. In the aggregate, consumers correctly perceive actual
risks posed by mousetraps; again, this is true because consumers do
not systematically misperceive product risks. The manufacturer ac-
tivity level will therefore be optimized; the total quantity of mouse-
traps sold will be efficient.
In contrast, consumers' individual estimates are, owing to the
cost of information, unlikely to be correct. Instead, individual esti-
mates of risk will likely be distributed normally about the actual risk.
There is a welfare loss associated with each errant estimate of a
mousetrap's risk.191 These welfare losses are what we refer to when
we say that consumer activity levels (i.e., the quantity of mousetraps
purchased by each consumer) are not optimal.
189 See Akerlof, supra note 48, at 490-91.
190 Paraphrased from quote attributed to Emerson: "If a man can write a better
book, preach a better sermon, or make a better mousetrap than his neighbor, though he
builds his house in the woods the world will make a beaten path to his door." JOHN
BARTLr'r, FAMmaAR QUOTATIONS 496 n.l (15th ed. 1980).
191 See Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 550 (alluding to this welfare loss).
1990]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
FIGURE 1
P D'
1_ \A B
C Actual Demand
Informed Demand
L- Q* Q? Q
Error of Commission
Consumers who overestimate the safety of BoDidgets (i.e., their
estimate of a BoDidget's total price is less than its actual total price)
will, as depicted in Figure 1, purchase too many mousetraps. We
shall refer to such estimates as "errors of commission." The de-
mand schedule D represents the quantity of BoDidgets that an indi-
vidual consumer would demand at every price if she were fully
informed of the risks of mousetraps. The demand schedule D' rep-
resents the consumer's actual demand for BoDidgets based on her
ill-informed and optimistic estimate. The consumer's activity level
in this case is too high. At a given price, P', the consumer purchases
(Q' - Q*) more than the optimal quantity of BoDidgets. For this
excess quantity of BoDidgets, the consumer pays the area Q*ABQ'.
However, from this excess she receives in benefits only Q*ACQ'.
Thus the loss resulting from the error of commission is illustrated as
the shaded area ABC.
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FIGURE 2
P G
E F
Informed Demand
Actual Demand
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Error of Omission
As depicted in Figure 2, consumers who underestimate the
safety of BoDidgets will purchase too few mousetraps. Such esti-
mates we shall call "errors of omission." The demand schedule D'
in Figure 2 represents the quantity of mousetraps that an individual
consumer would demand at every price were she ftilly informed.
The demand schedule D in this case represents the poorly informed,
"pessimistic" consumer's actual demand for BoDidgets. This con-
sumer's activity level is suboptimal. At a given price, P', she
purchases (Q' - Q*) too few BoDidgets. To purchase the optimal
quantity, Q', the consumer would only need to pay the area Q*EFQ'.
However, from these additional mousetraps she could enjoy the
benefit of area Q*GFQ'. Thus, the loss resulting from the error of
omission is illustrated by the consumer surplus foregone, area EFG.
To summarize, the losses resulting from errors of commission
and errors of omission derive from the fact that consumers, in a no-
liability world, demand a given product based on their perception of
that product's total price. The total price comprises a market price
and some expected accident cost. While the market price is evident
to consumers, the expected accident cost is not. As a result, con-
sumers must estimate a product's expected accident costs. Such es-
timates, because of the cost of information, will only approximate
the product's actual risks. To the extent that a consumer's estimates
of the risk deviate from the actual risk, there will be a welfare loss
resulting from either super- or suboptimal consumer activity levels,
depending on whether the particular consumer under- or over-esti-
mates the product's risks.192
192 See supra Section IV(B)(2)(d) (explaining why errors of omission and commission
are most significant in the context of nonpecuniary losses).
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c. Potential Market Response ("Reravelling").
Perhaps, as described above,193 manufacturers could obviate
both market failings by selling insurance with their mousetraps.1
94
Manufacturers could profitably sell their traps with actuarially fair
product risk insurance at some total price less than the average total
price. Indeed, any manufacturer able to make additional invest-
ments in care could increase profits by selling its product with insur-
ance, thereby offering consumers a lower total price.1 95 Because the
market price would include these costs, the market price would
equal the total price. Consumers, then, would be able to distinguish
efficiently safe from inefficiently unsafe mousetraps and would, in
effect, signify their preference for efficiently safe products merely by
choosing that product with the lowest market price. Accordingly,
the market for safe mousetraps would reemerge. Manufacturers, to
compete for consumers, would maximize their efficient investments
in care and would thereby minimize the expected costs of accidents
caused by their traps. In short, manufacturer care levels would be
optimized.
Consumers would, through the market price, know a mouse-
trap's total price. Because the market price constitutes the total
costs of a product, the market price in effect informs consumers of a
product's risks. Because consumers would know a product's total
price, they would adjust their activity levels accordingly. Stated dif-
ferently, there would be no errors of omission or commission. To
optimize their activity levels, consumers need not know what por-
tion of the price reflects insurance; they need only act rationally. If
the market price contains all the costs of a product, and consumers
know that the market price constitutes the total price, 196 consumers
will maximize welfare by consuming products until the ratio of mar-
ginal benefit to price is the same for all products.
So, if manufacturers sold insurance with their mousetraps, the
welfare losses associated with imperfect consumer information
193 See supra Section 11(B).
194 We are assuming here as elsewhere that the loading costs of such insurance
would be zero.
195 By selling insurance with their products, manufacturers, in effect, would inform
consumers of the safety level of their product. In other words, by insuring consumers
against product risks, a firm guarantees the quality level of its product at the given mar-
ket price. Such guarantees will be effective because manufacturers of relatively unsafe
products will find providing their product with insurance too expensive (unprofitable) at
that price. Thus, through different prices, consumers could distinguish safe from unsafe
products.
196 Consumers will know that the market price is the total price because firms that
compete by providing insurance with their products will advertise that fact. That is, to
win customers, firms will make known that the market price of their product constitutes
the total price.
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would be eliminated. But would the market, in fact, induce manu-
facturers to provide such insurance? How does widespread owner-
ship of first-party insurance, whose premiums generally fail to adjust
according to insureds' consumption choices, affect this analysis?
Since consumers are already insured through first-party mechanisms
for the risks of product accidents, they would quite rationally be un-
willing to pay a second insurance premium against such product
risks. Consequently, manufacturers would not be able to prevent
the losses stemming from imperfect consumer information. As il-
lustrated in Section III and as explained below, these losses cannot
be prevented except through the adoption of an enterprise liability
regime.
3. The Optimal Rule. Enterprise Liability
A negligence regime will not provide an efficient response to
the problem of imperfect consumer information for the same basic
reasons that it will not provide an efficient response to the insur-
ance-externality problem. First, courts applying a negligence stan-
dard will find it practically impossible to ascertain and enforce the
optimal manufacturer care level. In other words, the unravelling of
the market for manufacturer care would not be prevented through
the application of a negligence rule.
Second, since by definition a negligence regime holds manufac-
turers liable only for initially preventable accidents, a product's mar-
ket price under even a perfect negligence rule would not reflect the
costs of unprevefitable and residually preventable accidents. The
product's total price would not be reflected in its market price. Ac-
cordingly, consumers making consumption choices would rely on
imperfect estimates of each product's total price. Consumer activity
levels, therefore, would not be efficient.
Enterprise liability, on the other hand, requires manufacturers
to optimize manufacturer care and consumers to internalize a prod-
uct's total price. This is true because, as discussed previously,
under enterprise liability a manufacturer is required by law to pay
the costs of all accidents caused by its product, including residually-
preventable and unpreventable accident costs. Hence, consumers
will internalize the total price of consuming an additional unit of the
product and, therefore, will optimize consumer activity levels (i.e.,
they will consume until the marginal cost equals the marginal
benefit)197
197 See supra notes 135-37.
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B. Nonpecuniary Losses: The Trade-Off Between Insurance
and Deterrence
1 98
Here we relax the assumption that all losses are pecuniary.
Some product-accident losses are nonpecuniary in the sense that
they cannot be replaced by money or by a substitute good. 99 For
example, there is no perfect substitute for a lost loved one. "Pain
and suffering" are often considered nonpecuniary costs. The exist-
ence of nonpecuniary losses, as we shall describe more fully below,
creates a potential conflict between the insurance (compensation)
goal and the deterrence goal of products liability law: Some schol-
ars argue that, under certain assumptions, to optimize insurance
goals, consumers should not receive compensation for nonpecu-
niary losses-or at least not full compensation-because consumers
do not demand insurance for such losses.200 On the other hand,
scholars generally agree that to optimize deterrence, manufactur-
ers-when held liable-must bear all the losses their products
cause, including nonpecuniary losses.20 1
1. The Ambiguous Insurance Effects of Nonpecuniary-Loss Damages
There are two principal arguments in the literature concerning
the insurance effects of nonpecuniary losses. Both rely on the well-
accepted assumption that damage awards for accident losses should
equal the amount of insurance consumers would have purchased ex
ante. First, it is argued that a given consumer will demand insurance
for a nonpecuniary loss only if she expects that loss to increase her
marginal utility of income.202 The second argument seems to be
198 This subsection draws from S. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 153-54, 228-35, 245-54;
Phillip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of
Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q.J ECON. 143 (1977); Danzon, supra note 26; Graham &
Pierce, supra note 29; Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 35 (1982).
199 See supra note 62.
200 See P. HUBER, supra note 26, at 137; W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 10, at
186-87; S. SHAvELL, supra note 10, at 133; Kahan, supra note 163, at 434-35; Priest, supra
note 17, at 1553; Trebilcock, Efficient Liability Rules, supra note 32, at 249. See generally
Rea, supra note 198 (first to make this point; discussing damages for breach of contract).
But see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Insuring Against Nonpecuniary Losses (un-
published manuscript on file with authors).
201 See, e.g., S. SHAvELL, supra note 10, at 133-34; Priest, supra note 17, at 1553.
202 E.g., S. SHAvEL., supra note 10, at 228-30; Danzon, supra note 26, at 521 (citing
Graham and Pierce for proposition that, when nonpecuniary loss has occurred, optimal
compensation depends on how the injury affects the utility that the victim derives from
money); Schwartz, supra note 26, at 363-64. One commentator puts the point slightly
differently: "Mhe optimally insured individual will fully insure against the pecuniary
loss but will not insure against the nonpecuniary loss." John J. Donohue III, The Law
and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution (Book Review), 102 Hav. L. REv.
1047, 1065 (1989). The author continues: "If the marginal utility of wealth had de-
clined as a result of the accident, then the party would not fully insure against the pecuni-
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that even if all nonpecuniary losses increase consumers' marginal
utilities of income, consumers will never demand full insurance
against nonpecuniary losses. This is because nonpecuniary losses
are thought to have a negative wealth effect on consumers' demand
for normal goods in the injured state of the world.203 Each of these
arguments is pursued in greater detail below.
a. The Effect on Marginal Utility of Income.
In theory, consumers will demand insurance for nonpecuniary
losses only when such losses increase their marginal utility of money
in the injured state of the world.2°4 Which types of nonpecuniary
losses will increase or decrease a victim's marginal utility of income,
however, is an unsettled empirical question.20 5 Contrary to some
ary loss ... in the opposite case he would overinsure vis-a-vis the pecuniary loss ..
at 1065 n.59 (emphasis in original).
203 E.g., Schwartz, supra note 26, at 365-66 (citing Cook & Graham supra note 198).
It follows, then, that consumers will also not demand full insurance against pecuniary
losses that accompany nonpecuniary losses (again because of the wealth effect).
204 Economists generally agree that consumers purchase insurance to equalize mar-
ginal utilities of income over time and over possible states of the world. But see generally
Croley & Hanson, supra note 200 (arguing that consumers equalize their total utilities
over time and over possible states of the world). Through insurance, consumers trans-
fer pre-accident income to post-accident endowments until the marginal utility of the
last dollar transferred equals the marginal utility of that dollar at the time of transfer.
Under ideal markets, if all losses were pecuniary, consumers would demand full insur-
ance. For a mathematical proof of this proposition, see K. ARRow, supra note 35, at 212-
16. Consumers may not demand full insurance, however, if losses contain a significant
nonpecuniary component. This is true because such losses may alter a consumer's mar-
ginal utility of income. See W. Kip Viscusi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF
MARuEr PERFORMANCE 264-70 (1979); Spence, supra note 183, at 567-69. Insurance con-
siderations will therefore conflict with deterrence considerations (as outlined below)
only when a nonpecuniary loss does not increase the consumer's marginal utility of
income.
205 Professor Priest unjustifiably asserts that nonpecuniary losses never increase the
marginal utility of money. George L. Priest, The Liability Crisis: A Diagnosis, YALE L. REP.
2, 5 (Fall 1987); George L. Priest, Understanding the Liability Crisis, in NEw DIRErIoNs IN
IsABnmrrv LAw 207-08 (W. Olson ed. 1988). Other scholars recognize that the effect of a
nonpecuniary loss on a consumer's marginal utility is unclear and that it is an empirical,
not a theoretical, matter. See, e.g., S. SHAvEa., supra note 10, at 228-31; Danzon, supra
note 26, at 521; Schwartz, supra note 26, at 363-64. There are some types of nonpecu-
niary losses for which, intuitively, we might expect the marginal utility of income not to
increase. Professor Priest offers one such example:
Individuals ... do not voluntarily insure for non-pecuniary losses. Par-
ents, for example, do not typically purchase insurance on the life of a
minor child ... because.., there is no advantage to a family in suffering a
financial sacrifice by paying insurance premiums while the child is alive in
order to increase the family budget after the child dies.
Priest, supra note 17, at 1546. But see Croley & Hanson supra note 15, at Part III(B) (2) (a)
(arguing, among other things, that parents may demand nonpecuniary-loss insurance on
the lives of their children). For other examples, this conclusion seems unwarranted even
on an intuitive basis. Professor Schwartz, for example, tells a different sort of story.
Consider a business executive who runs recreationally and who loses a
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scholars' claims,20 6 the fact that market insurance for such losses is
uncommon 20 7 reveals very little about the effect of nonpecuniary
losses on consumers' marginal utilities of income; or, in other
words, about consumers' demand for such insurance. The paucity
of market insurance against nonpecuniary losses may simply reveal
the insurmountable supply-side impediments facing insurers who
attempt to offer this sort of insurance.2 08
Before considering the deterrence arguments for imposing
nonpecuniary losses on manufacturers, let us discuss the second in-
surance argument against awarding full damages to consumers who
suffer nonpecuniary losses.
b. The Wealth Effect.
It is widely believed that nonpecuniary losses cannot be fully
compensated.20 9 If this is true, an individual will suffer an income
or wealth effect in the accident state of the world because of the loss
of irreplaceable (nonpecuniary) wealth.210 If we assume, not unreal-
istically, that an individual spends most of her income on normal
goods, 211 then in the accident state of the world that individual will,
all else equal, want to spend less money than if she had not exper-
ienced the loss. Stated differently, because the individual will be
poorer in the accident state of the world, she will demand fewer
goods in that state. Anticipating this negative wealth effect, such a
consumer will, ex ante, demand less insurance to compensate her for
such an accident: because she will want to consume less overall ex
foot in an accident.... [T]he injury could increase the marginal utility of
money for this consumer if it caused her to substitute travel or the sym-
phony for running because these activities are more expensive. Her mar-
ginal utility could fall, however, if she substitutes reading for running.
Schwartz, supra note 26, at 364.
206 See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 26, at 524 (less than one percent of total contribu-
tions for health benefits are for insurance against accidental death and dismemberment
indicates low willingness to insure against pain and suffering); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking
Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REv. 772, 785 (1985) (no insurance com-
pany offers coverage for pain and suffering on first-party basis because of insufficient
demand for such coverage).
207 There are, however, a few examples of such insurance, including accidental
death and dismemberment insurance. See Danzon, supra note 26, at 524; Graham &
Pierce, supra note 29, at 466 n.23 (citing Richard Thaler & Sherwin Rosen, The Value of
Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RE-
SEARCH, STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH 265 (Nestor E. Terlecky ed. 1976)) (examining
evidence provided by markets for hazardous occupations regarding the compensation
required to induce people to accept higher risks of job-related injury disability).
208 Schwartz, supra note 26, at 365; Croley & Hanson, supra note 15, at Part
III(B)(2)(a).
209 See supra note 62.
210 Schwartz, supra note 26, at 365-66.
211 Normal goods are those that have positive income elasticities. P. SAMUELSON &
W. NORDHAUS, supra note 88, at 452-53.
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post, she will want to insure for less ex ante.212
Scholars have relied on this argument to explain why a con-
sumer who has suffered a nonpecuniary loss should receive less than
full compensation, that is, less than would be required to permit
that consumer to consume the same bundle of goods ex post that she
consumed ex ante.213 Thus, if a liability rule requires manufacturers
to compensate injured consumers for all the costs (including nonpe-
cuniary costs) of product accidents, this compensation may exceed
that which the consumers would have demanded in the form of first-
party insurance. To that degree, the compensation may be more
than optimal. A liability rule requiring full insurance, in other
words, may be requiring too much insurance. Even so, scholars
have failed to recognize a second, offsetting wealth effect.
Legal economists generally agree that beneficial deterrence
consequences result from a requirement that manufacturers com-
pensate injured consumers for nonpecuniary losses. If the
probability and magnitude of accidents are reduced because of such
a rule,214 then consumers will ex ante face less of a risk of an irre-
placeable loss. Similarly, consumers can expect a reduction in the
size of a loss in an accident state of the world. Consumers will enjoy
an increase in wealth, because of the decrease in expected loss expost
and the decrease in risk ex ante that result from the requirement that
manufacturers internalize nonpecuniary losses.21 5 If, ex ante, con-
212 There may be an exception to this result. It is possible that consumers with very
little wealth will spend the bulk of it on inferior goods (i.e., goods for which consump-
tion increases as income decreases). As a result of the nonpecuniary costs in the acci-
dent state of the world, such consumers will experience a decrease in wealth and,
therefore, will want to spend more money to consume more inferior goods than they did
before the accident. Such a consumer, cc ante, would recognize that, 6x post, she will
experience this wealth effect and, therefore, she will demand more insurance to compen-
sate her against such as an accident.
213 E.g., Schwartz, supra note 26, at 365-66 (citing Cook & Graham, supra note 198).
214 See infra Section IV(B)(2).
215 Cf R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 184-85 (explaining that as risk of nonpecuniary
loss such as death increases, an individual's wealth decreases because her likelihood of
being able to enjoy her wealth decreases); Schwartz, supra note 26, at 408 ("[R]isks are
current costs to people; consequently people are poorer when they face high risks
To be sure, one might argue that-wealth effects aside-the decrease in risk to con-
sumers resulting from the beneficial deterrence effects of requiring that manufacturers
pay nonpecuniary-loss damage awards would lower consumer demand for insurance. As
the risk faced by risk-averse consumers decreased, the argument goes, consumer de-
mand for insurance would decrease. This effect, however, represents the other side of
the equal increase in consumer demand for product-risk insurance that would result were
nonpecuniary-loss damage awards disallowed. Since these effects are offsetting, the ef-
fect on consumer demand for insurance resulting from the change in risk faced by con-
sumers, but unrelated to the change in consumer wealth, have no obvious bearing on
the policy decision over whether nonpecuniary-loss damages should be awarded. We
are grateful to Jason Johnston for making this point.
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sumers have more wealth because of the reduced risk of a product
accident, then they will demand more of all normal goods. Insur-
ance, it seems realistic to assume, is a normal good. Therefore, as a
result of the liability rule's deterrence effects, one might expect an
increase in consumer demand for insurance against product
accidents.2 16
Thus, for most consumers there are two wealth effects that one
must compare to determine whether manufacturers should be re-
quired on insurance grounds to compensate consumers for nonpe-
cuniary losses.217 First, one must ascertain to what extent a given
nonpecuniary loss reduces the wealth of the consumer in the acci-
dent state of the world such that, ex ante, the consumer will ration-
ally want to pay for less insurance to compensate her for all losses in
the event of an accident. Second, one must measure the extent to
which a liability rule requiring that manufacturers pay nonpecuniary
losses reduces the costs of accidents, so that consumers enjoy a pos-
itive wealth effect and therefore will ex ante want to buy more
insurance.
In deciding what should be the optimal damages paid by manu-
facturers and received by consumers following a product accident, it
is not a priori clear which of the two wealth effects will be greater. In
other words, it is not obvious whether, given the imposition of the
liability rule, consumers will ex ante demand more insurance or less.
In sum, without more information we cannot determine what effect,
if any, a liability rule will have on consumers' wealth or on that con-
sumers' demand for insurance.
2. The Unambiguous Deterrence Benefits of Nonpecuniary-Loss
Damages
Even if we assume arguendo that nonpecuniary losses do not
affect a person's marginal utility of money (such that consumers do
not demand nonpecuniary loss insurance), and even if we assume
further that nonpecuniary losses cause a net negative wealth effect
(such that consumers do not demand full insurance for their losses
in an injury state of the world), there remain important deterrence rea-
216 Put slightly differently, if because of the decrease in expected accident costs con-
sumers expect to have more wealth in the accident state of the world than they would
have had in the absence of the liability rule, then consumers will ev post demand more of
all normal goods than they would have absent such a rule. Therefore, anticipating the
cost-reducing benefits of the liability rule, consumers would ex ante demand more insur-
ance to compensate them against product accidents than they would have, had their
been no requirement that manufacturers compensate consumers for nonpecuniary
losses.
217 Note that this wealth-effect issue is separate from the issue of whether and how
the loss will affect the consumer's marginal utility of income. See supra Section
IV(B) (1) (a).
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sons to impose on manufacturers all losses their products cause, in-
cluding nonpecuniary losses. This subsection will show that the
conclusions as to the superiority of enterprise liability as a deter-
rence regime developed in Sections II and III apply only if we as-
sume that both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses are imposed on
manufacturers. To show this, we shall review our conclusion con-
cerning the four deterrence variables enumerated in Section III
(consumer care levels, manufacturer activity levels, manufacturer
care levels, and consumer activity levels) and shall examine how the
presence of nonpecuniary losses affects those variables.
a. Consumer Care Levels-Largely Unaffected.
As already indicated, given the first-party insurance externality,
no liability rule will optimize consumer care levels because consum-
ers will be compensated for their injuries and will therefore engage
to some extent in moral hazard.2 18 The presence of nonpecuniary
losses, however, alters this conclusion somewhat. Scholars agree
that nonpecuniary losses cannot be fully recompensed.2 19 Even if a
liability regime required manufacturers to pay nonpecuniary-loss
damages, consumers would not be made whole. Therefore, to the
extent that a consumer bears all or a portion of nonpecuniary losses,
she will have incentive to invest in care. That is, nonpecuniary
losses mitigate the problem of moral hazard, no matter the liability
regime.2 20
b. Manufacturer Activity Levels-Optimized.
This Article has explained that, owing to the first-party insur-
ance externality, manufacturer activity levels will be too high.
221
With regard to nonpecuniary losses, however, the insurance exter-
nality is less serious. This is true because, for whatever reasons,
first-party insurers typically do not cover such losses. 2 2 2 Consumers
are left to bear nonpecuniary losses themselves. Therefore, if con-
sumers are perfectly informed, aggregated consumer demand will
cause manufacturers to optimize activity levels.2 23 If, on the other
hand, consumers systematically underestimate the risk of nonpecu-
niary losses, as many scholars contend, then consumers' consump-
tion choices will generate non-optimal manufacturer activity
218 See supra Section III(B).
219 See supra note 62 and authorities cited supra note 198.
220 As we have already suggested, nonpecuniary losses may serve a copayment func-
tion. See supra text accompanying note 62.
221 See supra Section II(D)(2).
222 See supra Section II(D)(l).
223 See supra Section 1I(B).
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levels.
2 2 4
c. Manufacturer Care Levels-Optimized.
There is a consensus among law-and-economics scholars that,
to optimize manufacturer care levels, manufacturers must bear both
the pecuniary and the nonpecuniary costs their products cause when
found liable.225 Manufacturers must bear all losses to have ade-
quate incentive to invest in care.226 Measuring these losses will
doubtless prove difficult. Nonetheless, to optimize manufacturer
care, such measurements must be made, no matter the applicable
liability rule.22
7
d. Consumer Activity Levels-Improved.
Part A of this Section on consumer activity levels showed that if
prices do not fully reflect a product's risks to consumers, and if con-
sumers are imperfectly informed as to the actual risks posed by such
products, there will be a welfare loss associated with consumers' er-
rant estimates. 228 However, if all losses are pecuniary, and if con-
sumers are fully insured, consumers will not attempt to estimate
product risks, as they will not bear such risks. Consequently, there
will be no errors of omission and commission with regard to these
risks.
As to nonpecuniary losses, on the other hand, the problem of
non-optimal consumer activity levels may be quite significant. Be-
cause first-party insurers typically do not cover consumers for the
risks of nonpecuniary losses (and because nonpecuniary losses can-
not be fully recompensed), consumers must, based on imperfect in-
formation, estimate those risks in order to estimate a product's total
price. This perceived total price, as explained in Part A of this Sec-
tion, will randomly deviate from the actual total price, creating er-
rors of omission and commission. Optimizing consumer activity
levels, then, constitutes a second deterrence justification for impos-
ing nonpecuniary costs on manufacturers within an enterprise liabil-
ity regime.
224 See Spence, supra note 183, at 563; Polinsky & Rogerson, supra note 29, at 581.
This type of consumer misinformation provides ajustification for holding manufacturers
strictly liable for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses. See sources cited at supra
note 183.
225 See sources cited at supra note 201.
226 S. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 153-54.
227 Irrespective of the liability rule, then, courts must attempt to measure nonpecu-
niary losses. A court applying an optimal negligence regime, for example, must take
into account nonpecuniary costs when determining optimal care. This is true because to
set the correct cost-benefit standard a court must discover the full costs at issue.
228 See supra Section IV(A)(2)(b).
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C. The Trade-Off Between Insurance and Deterrence
Revisited
It is often stated in the literature229 -and we have shown here-
that for those nonpecuniary losses which do not increase a con-
sumer's marginal utility of income, there may be adverse insurance
effects associated with holding manufacturers liable. As we have
noted, however, whether a nonpecuniary loss does or does not in-
crease a consumer's marginal utility of income is an empirical mat-
ter of some dispute. We argued further that the wealth effect to
consumers from holding manufacturers liable for nonpecuniary as
well as pecuniary losses is also theoretically ambiguous. Thus, we
have shown that the insurance consequences of including nonpecu-
niary losses in an enterprise liability regime may or may not be dele-
terious. On the other hand, we have also articulated a variety of
deterrence considerations favoring such a regime. Therefore, even
if we assume that imposing nonpecuniary losses on manufacturers
has adverse insurance effects, it is still not clear whether these ef-
fects outweigh the beneficial deterrence effects of placing all costs
on manufacturers. Under that assumption, when deciding whether
or not to impose on manufacturers the nonpecuniary losses caused
by their products, there is an inevitable trade-off between the insur-
ance and deterrence goals of products liability law. 230
CONCLUSION
Even an efficient liability rule will leave some accidents un-
prevented. Against those unprevented accidents, risk-averse con-
sumers will desire insurance protection. Legal economists have
recently come to believe that such protection could be more effi-
ciently provided through first-party mechanisms than through en-
terprise liability qua insurance. They claim that manufacturers
cannot respond, whereas first-party insurers do respond, to the ob-
stacles facing all systems of insurance-such as moral hazard and
adverse selection. Section I of this Article argued that such claims
are unsubstantiated. Manufacturers may in fact be able to allocate
the risk of unprevented product accidents quite efficiently. And,
contrary to the received wisdom, first-party insurers fail to adjust
premiums according to each insured's consumption choices. This
failure gives rise to the first-party insurance externality.
As more fully explained in Sections II and III, the deterrence
229 E.g., S. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 232; Schwartz, supra note 26, at 367.
230 Others have recognized a trade-off between insurance and deterrence goals with
regard to the question of who should bear nonpecuniary losses. See, e.g., sources cited
supra note 229. However, they failed to include in their calculus the potentially benefi-
cial wealth effect and the consumer activity-level benefit that we describe.
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implications of this externality (i.e., the effect on the total number
and average cost of accidents) can be loosely summarized as follows.
Under a negligence regime, manufacturers will make suboptimal in-
vestments in product safety, and activity levels will be inefficiently
high. Under an enterprise liability regime, on the other hand, man-
ufacturers will efficiently invest in product safety, and activity levels
will be optimal. Enterprise liability, then, eliminates the insurance
externality for these deterrence variables. Unfortunately, neither
regime can overcome the externality with respect to consumer in-
vestments in care. Under both standards, consumer investments in
care will be less than efficient, and, as Section I explains, there is no
reason to believe first-party insurance has a comparative advantage
over enterprise liability in that regard. Hence, to optimize activity
levels and manufacturer care, courts and other lawmakers should
prefer enterprise liability to negligence. That consumer informa-
tion is costly and that product accidents entail nonpecuniary losses
increase the deterrence benefits of an enterprise liability regime and
bolster our ultimate conclusion that an absolute enterprise liability
regime is the most efficient.
23'
EPILOGUE
Having demonstrated the existence and the implications of the
231 Several scholars have harshly criticized Traynor's decision in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring), because
"his remorseless one-directional logic only accounts for plaintiff's verdicts . . . [and]
does not indicate any principled stopping point for recovery." Epstein, supra note 26, at
647-48; see also Owen, supra note 129; Trebilcock, Efficient Liability Rules, supra note 32, at
245-49. We have shown, however, that Traynor's logic may have been sound: So long
as an injured consumer can establish causation, it is not clear why there should be a
stopping point for recovery.
A few who read drafts of this Article expressed initial concern over the fact that we
appear to be arguing on behalf of a liability rule which would require consumers to pay
double for their insurance against the risk of product accidents: first to the first-party
insurer and then to the manufacturers of the products they consume. This concern,
however, is based on a misunderstanding of our argument. So long as insurers have a
right of subrogation, consumers will pay for product-risk insurance only when they
purchase products. In turn, of course, the price of first-party insurance would decrease
to reflect the reduction in expected accident costs for which the insurer would ultimately
be liable. See generally Viscusi, supra note 79, at 103-04. It is true that the total price that
consumers pay for their product-risk insurance under our proposed regime would be
greater than under a regime that did not allow nonpecuniary loss damages, but that
price increase is matched by greater compensation in the event of an accident and, as we
argued in Section IV, may be more than offset by deterrence benefits. See Section IV.
It should also be noted that under the enterprise liability regime that we propose,
manufacturers would not be liable for all injuries caused by their products. First-party
insurance policies exclude coverage for some injuries that are intentionally self-inflicted
(suicide being an extreme example). For such injuries, inasmuch as first-party insurance
does not cover the costs, there is no first-party insurance externality. For such injuries,
therefore, our justification for enterprise liability does not apply.
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first-party insurance externality, we now encounter another interest-
ing, if secondary, question: Why has this externality been previ-
ously disregarded by legal economists? The answer seems to be
that legal economists have not so much intentionally disregarded
the first-party insurance externality as they have overlooked it.
As this Article has demonstrated, the first-party insurance ex-
ternality plagues all forms of first-party insurance except, perhaps,
first-party automobile insurance. 232 To the extent that automobile
insurance classifies consumers according to their consumption
choices, it is the exception, not the rule. Commentators, however,
have wrongly presumed that auto insurance is representative of all
forms of first-party insurance, thereby tacitly accepting the assump-
tion that there is no first-party insurance externality. There are at
least three explanations for why scholars have adopted this "auto-
insurance paradigm."
The first reason stems from the influence of Calabresi's seminal
book, The Costs of Accidents.233 This book may be the most influential
work in tort scholarship. 234 It established what has been the pri-
mary focus of research in tort law for the past two decades. Its care-
ful treatment of countless issues that continue to fascinate today's
legal academicians make it an authoritative reference guide-sort of
a tort scholar's bible.235
Calabresi, like the generation of tort scholars before him,236
concentrated his research on the prodigious accident costs 237 ac-
232 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
233 G. CALABREsI, supra note 1.
234 R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 186 n.l.
235 Soon after the book was published, Frank Michelman described it as a "nigh-
inexhaustive (though sometimes exhausting) trove of arguments, rejoinders, perspec-
tives, considerations and satellite topics." Frank Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-
Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE LJ. 647, 648 (1971). Robert Rabin wrote
that "A leading influence among scholars taking an economic perspective [of tort law]
has been Guido Calabresi, whose book, The Costs of Accidents, provides a comprehen-
sive and systematic economic analysis of the tort system." ROBERT RABIN, PERSPECTIVES
ON TORT LAW 155 (2d ed. 1983).
One of the most influential legal scholars of his generation, Calabresi is
perhaps best known in the legal community for a book called The Costs of
Accidents, on transforming the understanding of civil liability through eco-
nomic analysis .... George L. Priest, himself a noted torts scholar, as-
sesses the book's impact: "What Guido did was bring real rigor to the
economic analysis of law. He really was a pioneer. Guido's stature in this
field is absolute. You have lawyers from the far provinces routinely and
familiarly using the terms of The Costs of Accidents.
Adam Liptak, Taking It Personally, 51 YALE 24, 25 (March 1988).
236 See Priest, supra note 16, at 482, 497.
237 For an estimation of the empirical magnitude of automobile accident losses, see
ALFRED CONARD, JAMES MORGAN, ROBERT PRAT, JR., CHARLES VOLTZ & ROBERT
BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (1964); FlemingJames & Stu-
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companying the rise of the automobile. 238 It is not surprising, then,
that Calabresi would address the insurance externality only in the
context of auto insurance. According to Calabresi, although first-
party automobile insurance is not perfect,23 9 it does in fact classify
insureds into acceptably narrow risk pools based on such character-
istics as age, gender, car type, driving record, and the like.240 Soci-
ety, according to Calabresi, can trust first-party auto insurers not to
significantly distort the effect of liability rules.241 Calabresi's more
general, though unintentional, message seems to have been that all
first-party insurance will reinforce, not undermine, the designs of
lawmakers to deter accidents. Commentators who were influenced
by Calabresi's work, therefore, may have overlooked the first-party
insurance externality because they presumed that all first-party in-
surance classifies as well as automobile insurance does.
Second, even if not influenced by Calabresi, tort scholars tend
to focus on car insurance simply because car insurance is very im-
portant. Automobiles are responsible for a large percentage of the
accident costs in our society. 242 Moreover, automobile accident
cases constitute the most frequent type of negligence case.243 If,
therefore, a legal scholar were going to discuss just one type of first-
party insurance in her analysis of liability rules, it should not be
surprising that she would choose car insurance. Finally, perhaps
commentators concentrate on car insurance because applying for
and owning car insurance is an experience familiar to most legal
scholars and their audiences. For this reason, too, we should expect
authors examining first-party insurance to choose the car-insurance
art Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN.
BJ. 70 (1952).
238 See, e.g., A. CONARD, supra note 237; ROBERT KEETON &JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BA-
SIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICrIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AuTOMOBILE
INSURANCE (1965); H. Ross, supra note 156. Calabresi still calls the car "the Gift of the
Evil Deity." GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTnTUDES, AND THE LAW Ch. 1 (1985).
239 For a discussion of what Calabresi considers the imperfections, see G. CALA-
BRESI, supra note 238, at 103-05; see also Calabresi, supra note 32, at 838.
240 G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 146-47.
241 Id at 248; cf Fleming, supra note 8, at 825 (suggesting that car insurance may
foster deterrence goals).
242 See citations supra note 237; R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 27, at 469 (Litiga-
tion regarding auto accidents "occupies ... a large fraction ... of the court system's
limited resources.").
Automobile accidents represent one of the highest risks of injury that the
ordinary citizen faces. Moreover, disputes arising from those accidents
account for a large fraction of all civil complaints... . Thus, it is not
surprising that dissatisfaction with the tort liability system's method of
dealing with losses arising from automobile accidents is of long standing.
Id. at 463; see THE 1988 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 793 (41st ed. 1988); Donohue,
supra note 202, at 1047 & n.5.
243 R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 186-87.
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Of course, it is not at all dear that car insurance segregates in-
sureds into optimally narrow risk pools. 245 The fact that they segre-
gate at all, however, seems to have assured scholars that car
insurance is to be trusted. One explanation for why car insurers
may more efficiently segregate insureds is that car insurers rely on
police departments and other publicly financed institutions to moni-
tor insureds as they drive and to gather and report information
about insureds who violate traffic rules or who are involved in
accidents.
In sum, it seems that commentators involved in the debate over
the comparative efficiency of products liability rules either have en-
tirely ignored the potential effect of first-party insurance on the effi-
cacy of products liability rules or-implicitly assuming that what is
true of first-party car insurance is true of all first-party insurance-
have asserted that there is no first-party insurance externality.
246
The important debate over the efficiency of enterprise liability, then,
has been based on a false shared premise, the automobile-insurance
paradigm. 247
244 Another reason the first-party insurance externality may have been overlooked is
that until recently, most law-and-economics models have been based on the assumption
that "consumers have no role to play in the avoidance of injuries from product use ......
For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and
Enterprise Liability, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 123, 124-32 (1982). Because scholars, in essence,
assumed away the role of consumers, they may have been insensitive to the potentially
adverse deterrence effects of consumer-owned, first-party insurance.
245 See, e.g., JERRY L. MAsHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY
242-43 (1990) (describing difficulties confronting first-party automobile insurers).
246 See supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
247 Consistent with this observation, courts and academic commentators have re-
cently been criticized for failing to consider institutions-such as insurance-outside the
tort system, and for focusing too narrowly only on one method-tort liability-of man-
aging risks. Viscusi, supra note 79, at 65; see Stewart, supra note 15, at 184-85.
Another possible reason for why scholars have overlooked the first-party insurance
externality is that they were preoccupied with the potentially deleterious deterrence ef-
fects of liability insurance. See supra note 10 and text accompanying notes 7-12. Legal
economists have eased that concern in two ways. First, they reasoned that even ifliabil-
ity insurance does lead to more accidents, it may nevertheless be desirable from a social
efficiency standpoint. See supra note 10. More important, commentators now believe
that commercial liability insurance probably does not significantly blunt the deterrence
effects of tort law. Cf G. EADs & P. REUTER, supra note 113, at viii (concluding that "[o]f
all the various external social pressures, product liability has the greatest influence on
[manufacturers'] product design"). Indeed, some argue that commercial liability insur-
ance, if it has any effect, may actually enhance tort law incentives. See id. at 25-3 1; see also
Mayers & Smith, supra note 50, at 282 (arguing that insurance firms may have a "com-
parative advantage.., in monitoring certain aspects of the firm's real activities" as com-
pared to shareholders and other interested parties); Schwartz, supra note 79, at 337-38
("Indeed, in one way liability rules combined with such insurance might produce even
better safety results than liability rules standing on their own: for a liability insurer may
be able to offer safety advice to an insured that will permit the latter actually to improve
the level of safety it provides."). Schwartz also noted:
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This Article argues that legal economists have failed to consider
A liability insurer, by processing a large number of claims and by con-
ducting the reviews and inspections that lead to its own underwriting de-
cisions, may well become an expert in techniques of risk prevention [or
loss control]-indeed, more of an expert than the insured itself. If so,
then this is an expertise that the insurer can pass on to the insured.
Id. at 356; see also Shavell, supra note 8, at 121 (concluding that "liability insurance does
not have an undesirable effect on the working of liability rules ... the terms of insurance
policies sold in a competitive setting would be such as to provide an appropriate substi-
tute.., set of incentives to reduce accident risks.").
As an empirical matter, there is little question that manufacturers' liability insurers
are more responsive than consumers' first-party insurers are to the risks of their in-
sureds. Under "feature rating," for example, liability insurers survey the insureds' oper-
ations and adjust premiums accordingly. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 48. Under
experience rating, liability insurers adjust premiums according to insureds' previous lia-
bility records insofar as those records are predictive of expected liability. Schwartz,
supra note 79, at 320-21; see also Croley & Hanson, supra note 15, at Part IV(B) (illustrat-
ing how liability insurers have employed copayment mechanisms and policy exclusions
to encourage insureds to prevent preventable accidents); id at Part IV(C) (describing
the rise of new forms of commercial liability insurance-e.g., mutuals-to cope with
some of the sorts of market problems that underlie the first-party insurance externality);
Fleming, supra note 8, at 825 ("In the case of industrial and commercial enterprises, the
safety inspection service operated by liability insurers becomes [a] valuable adjunct to
accident-preventive procedures .... "); Nelson Lacey, The Competitiveness of the Property-
Casualty Insurance: A Look at Market Equity Values and Premium Prices, 5 YALEJ. ON REG. 501,
506-11 (1988) (insured firms have incentives to reduce risky behavior because insurance
premiums reflect long-term risks generated by their operations). Priest, supra note 129,
at 1043-44 (arguing that liability insurers have adopted several mechanisms recently to
avoid blunting incentives for safety). Thus, it seems reasonable for scholars to have
concluded that manufacturers' incentives to prevent accidents are not significantly dis-
torted by a "liability insurance externality." And perhaps it was from this conclusion
that scholars willingly but wrongly lept to the less reasonable conclusion that there is no
first-party insurance externality.
Although this discussion suggests another partial explanation for why scholars pre-
viously ignored the first-party insurance externality, it raises an important question.
How can our upbeat description of liability insurance be reconciled with our claim that
first-party insurance performs so poorly? The answer, we believe, turns on several sig-
nificant differences between the two types of insurance. To begin with, as compared to
first-party insurers, corporate liability insurers cover a relatively small group of insureds,
who buy relatively expensive policies. With much more at stake in each policy, the cor-
porate liability insurer finds it worthwhile to use a relatively detailed application, to ver-
ify the information received on applications, to monitor each insured closely, and to
carefully investigate claims made by insureds. Moreover, the benefits to liability insurers
of creating incentive schemes to control for moral hazard and the like will be greater
simply because manufacturers may be more responsive than consumers to such incen-
tives. See supra note 181; cf Priest, supra note 17, at 1561 ("Some of this insurance un-
doubtedly represents the purchase of risk monitoring . . . services from commercial
casualty insurers."); Priest, Understanding the Liability Crisis, in NEw DIR roNs IN IIABIL-
rry LAw, supra note 205, at 197 (arguing that under "commercial liability coverage,....
rates and policy terms are usually set on a customer-by-customer basis .... By contrast,
[under first-party insurance,] ... coverage is more standardized .... "); Schwartz, supra
note 79, at 318 n.21 (product liability insurance premiums are adjusted to reflect even
insureds' activity levels). Not only are the benefits of monitoring each insured relatively
high, but, because of the relatively small number of insureds in each pool, the costs of
monitoring insureds are relatively low. See generally Croley & Hanson, supra note 15, at
Part IV(C)(2) (explicating the benefits of small numbers in insurance pools). Moreover,
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the effects of first-party insurance on the efficacy of liability rules
and that, given the first-party insurance externality, this oversight
substantially undermines their conclusions. But the issues in this
debate are complex, and our conclusions should be regarded as pre-
liminary. Although we think the case strong, we have not proved that
an enterprise liability rule will always maximize social welfare. Re-
search in this area is still at the threshold. This Article, however,
illustrates inadequacies in previous theoretical attempts to choose
among liability rules and, if nothing more, initiates a challenge to
further research.
248
it seems plausible that liability insurers can more easily assess the safety characteristics
of its insureds' products, inasmuch as manufacturers typically produce large quantities
of homogeneous products. In contrast, it may be relatively difficult for first-party insur-
ers to assess the consumption choices of consumers, because consumers tend to buy a
large variety but small quantity of consumer products.
The free-rider problem is less significant in commercial liability insurance lines than
it is in personal (first-party) insurance lines for another reason. The regulatory pressure
to standardize insurance policies, see supra note 129, is much weaker in the former than it
is in the latter: "personal lines are purchased by consumers who regulators seek to
protect because consumers are generally regarded as uninformed about insurance, and
commercial lines are purchased by business firms which, because of greater commercial
ability, compel less regulatory protection." Priest, supra note 129, at 1002.
Finally, insofar as free-riding occurs through moral hazard and adverse selection in
the form of fraudulent misrepresentations by insureds, see, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETroN &
ALAN I. WIDIsS, INSURANCE LAw 567 (1988) (fraud in the application process is a major
problem confronting all insurers); Waldman, supra note 95, at 47 ("roughly 10 percent
of auto premiums go to pay for fraud"). Free-riders in a corporate liability pool face a
greater likelihood of being detected than do free-riders in a first-party pool. This is true
not just because the insurer monitors the manufacturers more closely (as suggested
above) but also because manufacturers are easier to monitor. Cf. Alan Schwartz, A The-
oy of Loan Priorities, 18 LEGAL STUD. 209, 220-21, 224 (explaining why it is relatively easy
for creditors to ascertain a potential debtor's debt status). Consider the insurance appli-
cation process. Manufacturer-insureds, unlike first-party insureds, are usually required
to provide a great deal of information (much of it publicly) to other institutions for other
reasons (e.g., filings with the SEC, the IRS, shareholders and bondholders, state and
federal regulatory agencies). To that extent, the cost to manufacturers of fraudulent
misrepresentations on the application is higher because of the larger number of infor-
mation monitors and the disparate incentives created by different disclosure require-
ments. Moreover, manufacturers probably find it more administratively costly to
commit fraud, all else equal, than consumers do: the larger the entity, the larger the
amount of coordination required to carry out fraud. Put differently, the more people
required to maintain a secret, the more difficult it is to maintain secrecy. Cf. Robert C.
Ellickson, The Case for Coase Against Coaseanism, 99 YALE L.J. 611, 617 (1989) ("organiza-
tions cannot nimbly respond to unusual business opportunities"); Helen A. Garten, In-
sider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 Wis. L. Rv. 573, 637 (describing firms'
apparent carelessness in transmitting sensitive information); Thomas W. Merrill, The Ec-
onomics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 81-82 (1986) (government is unable to use
same methods as private investors to assemble large parcels of land because government
has more difficulty maintaining secrecy).
248 For instance, as Section I emphasized, it is theoretically possible that, for some
individual-risk characteristics, enterprise liability would create relatively heterogeneous
risk pools as compared to those that first-party insurance would create under a negli-
gence rule. As Section I described, heterogeneous risk pools may generate welfare
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This Article has examined the first-party insurance externality
only for its implications for the choice of an efficient products liabil-
ity regime. This externality, however, may have other, more general
implications. For instance, it may be enlightening to re-examine the
choice between using liability rules and using direct regulation to
generate efficiently safe consumer products. Likewise, in light of
the fact that previous analysts have overlooked the first-party insur-
ance externality, it may be useful to critically scrutinize the putative
causes of the recent insurance crisis.
249
Finally, even broader implications follow from the most general
reading of this Article's thesis that the presence of insurance may
affect the choice among legal rules. Insofar as any law is intended to
allocate costs among parties so as to create incentives for appro-
priate behavior, lawmakers should take into account the extent to
which the parties are insured against those costs and the potential
incentive-blunting effects of that insurance. The failure of
lawmakers to consider the potentially adverse effects of first-party
insurance suggests that areas of the law besides products liability
should be re-examined in light of the first-party insurance
externality.
losses in the form of adverse selection. Therefore, it is conceivable-though we suspect
unlikely-that, for some subset of these product risks, the welfare loss will outweigh the
social welfare gain stemming from the beneficial deterrence implications of enterprise
liability. Whether such product risks exist is an empirical question which probably can-
not be fully answered absent the adoption of enterprise liability.
Similarly, we-like everyone involved in this debate-cannot claim to know with
certainty the net effect of nonpecuniary losses on the relative efficiency of products lia-
bility rules. This Article has provided new theoretical arguments in favor of requiring
manufacturers to compensate consumers for such losses. Ultimately, however, this too
is an empirical matter. Definitive answers await further research.
249 See Croley & Hanson, supra note 15.
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